Total
10217 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-71493 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | N/A | ||
| Infracost provides cloud cost intelligence for engineers, AI coding agents, and CI/CD. Prior to 0.10.45, the readFile, pathExists, isDir, and matchPaths template functions in internal/config/template/parser.go use a lexical filepath.Rel check and a leaf-only os.Lstat check that do not resolve an intermediate directory symlink. A repository can contain a path such as evil/file where evil points outside the checkout, causing os.ReadFile and related operations to follow the symlink and read runner-accessible files. The resulting content is rendered into generated configuration and can be surfaced through the Infracost dashboard or pull request comment, with greater impact in workflows that provide repository secrets. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.45. | |||||
| CVE-2026-71215 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH | ||
| art-template's sub-template resolution logic (src/compile/adapter/resolve-filename.js), used by both the include and extend template directives, resolves the target file path via path.resolve(root, filename) with no check afterward that the result remains inside root. | |||||
| CVE-2026-71209 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH | ||
| audiobookshelf's authentication-exemption check (server/routers/Auth.js) matches unauthenticated-allowed GET routes against req.path via a regex requiring a literal /items/:id/cover or /authors/:id/image shape, where req.path retains %2F sequences URL-encoded. CacheManager.handleCoverCache then joins this decoded value into a cache file path and streams the result before any database-backed ownership check. | |||||
| CVE-2026-81030 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM | ||
| Mage AI does not confine the paths accepted by its browser-items API to the project directory. BrowserItemResource in mage_ai/api/resources/BrowserItemResource.py passes a caller-supplied path to the filesystem read and write helpers without calling the containment helper that the sibling FileContentResource and FileResource classes both use, so the resource contains no such call while those two contain several. A user holding the Viewer role, which grants read access within the project and nothing outside it, can therefore read any file the server process can read by supplying an absolute path. The permission model that would otherwise separate roles is not consulted for this route in the default configuration, because the setting that enables it defaults to false. Callers holding the Editor role additionally write through the same unconfined path, though that role is already able to execute code by design, so the boundary crossed by this flaw is the read available to the Viewer role. | |||||
| CVE-2026-77139 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | N/A | ||
| The extension fails to validate a client-supplied template element key before using it to build file paths for saving and deleting Mask template files. An authenticated backend user with access to the Mask module can supply a key containing path traversal sequences to create or delete .html files outside the configured template directory. | |||||
| CVE-2026-71268 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 9.9 CRITICAL | ||
| OpenPLC Runtime v3's compile_program function (webserver/openplc.py) parses directives from uploaded Structured Text (.st) program files and writes the referenced content to with no validation that file_path stays within the ./core directory. A path-validation function, validate_file_path, exists elsewhere in the codebase (webserver/credentials.py) but is never invoked from compile_program, leaving the sink unprotected. | |||||
| CVE-2026-71279 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 8.0 HIGH | ||
| Zigbee2MQTT's ExternalJSExtension.getFilePath (lib/extension/externalJS.ts) joins a parameter received via an MQTT message (topic zigbee2mqtt/bridge/request/extension/save) into the extensions base path using path.join(basePath, name) with no sanitization. The extension handler only validates that the name ends in .js/.mjs/.cjs, writes the file, and then dynamically imports it via Node.js import, achieving remote code execution. | |||||
| CVE-2026-71283 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 4.9 MEDIUM | ||
| Fledge's backup-restore upload handler, upload_backup (python/fledge/services/core/api/backup_restore.py), calls tarfile.extractall(temp_path) on an admin-uploaded tar archive with no filter argument and no per-member path validation. Requires the admin role (@has_permission("admin")). | |||||
| CVE-2026-71932 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 4.9 MEDIUM | ||
| Multiple DrayTek VigorSwitch models contain a directory traversal vulnerability in the getSyslogFile function. The vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation of the option field. A remote attacker can trigger this vulnerability via crafted input containing path traversal sequences to access arbitrary files on the device. Exploitation requires valid administrative credentials for the device's web management interface. | |||||
| CVE-2026-77086 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 9.1 CRITICAL | ||
| SiYuan before v3.7.4 fails to validate the packageName parameter in Bazaar install and uninstall endpoints, allowing authenticated administrators to perform path traversal via directory traversal sequences. Attackers with admin access can write arbitrary files to any location via install operations or recursively delete directories via uninstall operations by supplying crafted packageName values. | |||||
| CVE-2026-60084 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 8.7 HIGH | ||
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 contain an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability in the /api/search/removeTemplate endpoint that accepts an unvalidated path parameter passed directly to os.RemoveAll. Authenticated admin attackers can supply absolute filesystem paths to recursively delete any file or directory the kernel process has permission to remove, anywhere on the host filesystem. | |||||
| CVE-2026-69086 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 7.7 HIGH | ||
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.3 fail to validate the avID parameter on all code branches in attribute-view read endpoints, allowing attackers to construct traversal paths that escape the storage directory. Authenticated users with RoleReader permissions or anonymous clients when publish authentication is disabled can read JSON files outside the attribute-view directory to disclose cross-scope database content. | |||||
| CVE-2026-74798 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 8.7 HIGH | ||
| SiYuan kernel before v3.7.4 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the database_clean MCP tool. The tool performs only an empty-string check on the id parameter before passing it to RemoveUnusedAttributeView (kernel/model/attribute_view.go), which builds a filesystem path via filepath.Join without validating that id matches SiYuan's node-ID format. An authenticated MCP client can supply path traversal sequences in id to cause the kernel to copy an arbitrary file readable by the process into SiYuan's history directory (arbitrary file read) and then delete the original file (arbitrary file deletion). The corresponding HTTP API handler was hardened in GHSA-7hm9-v7vf-7g4w, but this MCP caller was not. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72783 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 6.2 MEDIUM | ||
| Craft CMS versions >= 5.0.0-RC1 before 5.10.6 and >= 4.0.0-RC1 before 4.18.2 contain a theoretical path traversal weakness in the ensurePathIsContained function of the Local file system class. The order of operations validates the path before normalization, so normalization could invalidate prior validation assumptions (a desanitization-style issue) and potentially resolve to files outside the intended volume directory. The vendor notes the issue is not directly exploitable and no exploitable scenario has been discovered; the fix is recommended for hardening. | |||||
| CVE-2026-14194 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM | ||
| Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Bilin Software and Informatics Consultancy Inc. HUMANIST Digital Human Resources allows Path Traversal. This issue affects HUMANIST Digital Human Resources: from 26.0 before 26.1. | |||||
| CVE-2026-13048 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 8.2 HIGH | ||
| Data::MuForm::Localizer versions through 0.05 for Perl execute Perl from a message catalog header, reached at an arbitrary path because load_lexicon interpolates the language attribute into the catalog filename. load_lexicon builds the catalog path by appending `Messages/$lang.po` to the directory holding Localizer.pm, where $lang is the language attribute, with no check that it names a bare locale tag. A value holding `../` segments walks out of the message directory, so any readable path with a `.po` suffix is loaded. While parsing the catalog, extract_header_msgstr takes the `Plural-Forms:` header, prefixes `$` to the bare words nplurals, plural and n, and passes the rest verbatim into a string that is evaluated: the nplurals form evaluates the header expression immediately, and the plural_code form compiles it into a subroutine whose body runs when a plural message is localized. A header of `nplurals=2; plural=(system('...'),0);` therefore runs that command as the catalog loads. The evaluation inherits strict, so an expression that assigns to an undeclared variable fails to compile, while one built from calls alone does not. An application that sets the language attribute from request data, an Accept-Language header or a locale parameter, and an attacker who can place a file with a `.po` suffix and chosen contents at a readable path, together give code execution as the application user. The message expansion path is not affected: expand_named substitutes only the placeholder names the caller supplies, and _mangle_value returns the value unchanged. | |||||
| CVE-2026-15585 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH | ||
| Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in AKIN Software Computer Import Export Industry and Trade Ltd. AKINSOFT Wolvox9 ERP / KontrolPanel.exe allows Path Traversal. This issue affects AKINSOFT Wolvox9 ERP / KontrolPanel.exe: from s26.02.17 before 26.02.22. | |||||
| CVE-2026-74764 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | N/A | ||
| Pandora contains a path traversal vulnerability in its TAR archive extraction functionality. When processing a submitted TAR archive, the extractor passed archive member names directly to Python's tarfile.TarFile.extract() without applying an extraction filter. An attacker able to submit a specially crafted TAR archive containing malicious member paths, such as paths using ../ sequences or absolute paths, could cause extracted files to be written outside the intended extraction directory. This may allow the attacker to overwrite files accessible to the Pandora worker process and could potentially result in application compromise, arbitrary code execution, or denial of service depending on the files targeted and the privileges of the Pandora process. The vulnerability is corrected by using Python's filter='data' extraction filter, which rejects or sanitizes dangerous TAR members, including paths that escape the destination directory and unsafe link targets. The weakness corresponds to MITRE's general path traversal category, which includes archive extraction cases where attacker-controlled filenames cause files to be written outside the intended directory. | |||||
| CVE-2026-77751 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | N/A | ||
| A path traversal vulnerability existed in the handling of MISP object template names during STIX 2 import and MISP-to-STIX 2 export. MISP object names are passed to PyMISP's object-template resolution mechanism, which constructs a filesystem path by joining the configured MISP object-template directory, the object name, and definition.json. An object name originating from untrusted STIX or MISP content was not sufficiently restricted before being used in this filesystem path. An attacker able to supply a crafted object name containing path separators or traversal sequences such as ../ could therefore cause template resolution to escape the expected template directory and attempt to load a definition.json file from another location accessible to the process. During STIX 2 import, an attacker-controlled x_misp_name from a custom STIX object could directly reach this template-resolution mechanism. The issue could also become persistent. A malicious object name stored in a MISP event could later be processed again during STIX 2 export. Consequently, content originally introduced in one security context could trigger filesystem access later when the event is exported by a process operating with different or greater privileges. If a suitable definition.json file exists outside the intended template directory, its contents may be interpreted as a MISP object template and fields from that file copied into the converted object. This can result in unintended disclosure of locally accessible data represented by the template file and modification of the resulting object's metadata or semantics. The patches introduce strict validation of object-template names. Valid names are restricted to a single path component containing letters, digits, hyphens, or underscores. Names that do not meet these requirements are replaced with the generic unknown-template name before reaching PyMISP template resolution. The original rejected name is preserved in the object's comment and a warning is generated, preventing traversal while retaining the source information. | |||||
| CVE-2026-78381 | 2026-08-26 | N/A | N/A | ||
| RansomLook contains a path traversal vulnerability in the handling of the screen field associated with group posts. The GroupPost.get API handler concatenates the database-controlled screen value directly with the application's source/ directory and opens the resulting path without verifying that the resolved file remains within the intended directory. Because the screen field is free-form and can be populated either through the administrative post editor or through data imported from a remote RansomLook instance, a malicious upstream instance can provide traversal sequences such as ../config/generic.json. When the affected post is subsequently retrieved through the API, RansomLook resolves and reads the attacker-controlled path and returns the contents of the referenced file Base64-encoded in the API response. This can allow an attacker (being admin) controlling imported post data to read arbitrary files accessible to the RansomLook process, potentially exposing sensitive configuration data, API credentials, password hashes, or other application secrets. The attack does not require the malicious upstream to possess an account on the affected RansomLook instance. The vulnerability is addressed by resolving screen paths with os.path.realpath() and verifying that the resolved path remains beneath the application's source/ directory. Validation is performed both when values are written and immediately before files are read. Using canonical paths also prevents traversal through symbolic links that would bypass purely lexical path normalization checks. | |||||