Total
398612 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-72175 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | 7.1 HIGH | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/proc/task_mmu: fix make_uffd_wp_huge_pte() prot-update race Patch series "userfaultfd/pagemap: pre-existing fixes". These are pre-existing bug fixes that were carried at the front of the userfaultfd RWP working-set-tracking series up to v5 [1]. Per review feedback that fixes should not sit in the middle of a feature series, they are split out and sent on their own; the RWP series is reposted rebased on top of this. All six were flagged by the Sashiko AI review of the RWP series and carry independent of RWP, apply to mm-new directly, and carry Cc: stable@. 1: fs/proc/task_mmu: a missing huge_ptep_modify_prot_start() in make_uffd_wp_huge_pte() can lose hardware Dirty/Accessed updates when PAGEMAP_SCAN write-protects a hugetlb PTE. 2: fs/proc/task_mmu: pagemap_scan_hugetlb_entry() compares the range against HPAGE_SIZE rather than the hstate page size, so it never write-protects gigantic hugetlb pages. 3: fs/proc/task_mmu: PAGEMAP_SCAN with PM_SCAN_WP_MATCHING over an unpopulated hugetlb range self-deadlocks -- pagemap_scan_pte_hole() calls uffd_wp_range() while walk_hugetlb_range() holds the hugetlb vma lock for read, and hugetlb_change_protection() then takes it for write. Install the marker inline instead. 4: mm/huge_memory: change_non_present_huge_pmd() drops pmd_swp_uffd_wp on a device-private PMD permission downgrade, silently losing the uffd-wp marker. 5: userfaultfd: must_wait() applies pte_write() to a locklessly read PTE without checking pte_present(), so swap/migration entries decode random offset bits and a thread can stay parked on a stale fault. 6: userfaultfd: __VMA_UFFD_FLAGS feeds VMA_UFFD_MINOR_BIT (41) to mk_vma_flags() unconditionally, an out-of-bounds write into the single-word vma_flags_t on 32-bit. Build the mask from config-gated per-mode masks so an unavailable bit is never materialised. This patch (of 6): make_uffd_wp_huge_pte() arms the UFFD_WP bit on a present HugeTLB PTE by calling huge_ptep_modify_prot_commit() with a ptent snapshot that was fetched without the corresponding huge_ptep_modify_prot_start(). The start helper is what atomically clears the entry so the kernel-owned snapshot stays consistent until the commit; without it, the hardware may set Dirty or Accessed in the live PTE between the original read and the commit, and huge_ptep_modify_prot_commit() (whose generic implementation just calls set_huge_pte_at()) then writes the stale snapshot back over the live hardware bits, losing the update. The non-hugetlb sibling make_uffd_wp_pte() does this correctly via ptep_modify_prot_start() / ptep_modify_prot_commit(). Mirror that pattern for the present-PTE branch. The migration case stays as-is -- migration entries are non-present, so there's no hardware update to race against. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72174 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/proc/task_mmu: fix hugetlb self-deadlock in pagemap_scan_pte_hole() A PAGEMAP_SCAN ioctl requesting PM_SCAN_WP_MATCHING on a hugetlb VMA hangs the calling thread, unkillably, as soon as the scan reaches an unpopulated part of the range: do_pagemap_scan() walk_page_range() walk_hugetlb_range() hugetlb_vma_lock_read() # take the vma lock for read ... pagemap_scan_pte_hole() # ... ->pte_hole() for a hole uffd_wp_range() change_protection() hugetlb_change_protection() hugetlb_vma_lock_write() # ... and block taking it for write walk_hugetlb_range() holds the hugetlb vma lock for read across the whole walk. A present entry goes to ->hugetlb_entry(); an unpopulated one goes to ->pte_hole(), i.e. pagemap_scan_pte_hole(). To write-protect the hole that handler calls uffd_wp_range(), which on a hugetlb VMA reaches hugetlb_change_protection() and takes the same vma lock for write. The thread then blocks in down_write() waiting for the read lock it is itself holding. The populated path avoids this: pagemap_scan_hugetlb_entry() write-protects the entry inline under the page-table lock and never enters hugetlb_change_protection(). Do the same for holes. Fault in the page table and install the uffd-wp marker directly with make_uffd_wp_huge_pte() under the page-table lock, rather than routing through uffd_wp_range(). That is the same sequence hugetlb_change_protection() runs for an unpopulated entry, minus the vma write lock -- which is safe to skip because PMD sharing is disabled on uffd-wp VMAs (hugetlb_unshare_all_pmds() runs at registration), leaving nothing for that lock to serialise against. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72173 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/proc/task_mmu: do not warn on seeing non-migration pmd entry Patch series "mm/hmm: A fix and a selftest", v3. Patch 1 fixes a stale warning present from the time when only migration softleaf entries were supported at the PMD level. Patch 2 adds some code into hmm-tests.c which exercises the pagemap path for PMD device-private entries. This patch (of 2): pagemap_pmd_range_thp() warns if a non-present PMD is not a migration entry. This became false once device-private entries at the PMD level were added. Therefore, remove the stale migration-only assertion. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72171 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: slram: remove failed entries from the device list register_device() links a new slram_mtdlist entry before allocating all of the state needed by the entry. If a later allocation, memremap(), or mtd_device_register() fails, the partially initialized entry remains on the global list. A later cleanup can then dereference or free invalid state from that failed entry. Unwind the partially initialized entry and clear the list tail on each failure path after the entry has been linked. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72169 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: kho: make sure scratch size is always aligned by CMA_MIN_ALIGNMENT_BYTES When using scratch_scale, the scratch sizes are rounded up to CMA_MIN_ALIGNMENT_BYTES since they will be released as MIGRATE_CMA. This is not done when using fixed scratch sizes via command line. This can result in user specifying a size which is not aligned, and thus kernel releasing a pageblock that is only partially scratch. Do the rounding up for both cases in scratch_size_update(). | |||||
| CVE-2026-72167 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: rawnand: pl353: fix probe resource allocation During probe(), the devm_ioremap() is called with the parent device instead of the current one. So when the module is unloaded, the register area isn't released. Target the pl35x device in the devm_ioremap() instead of its parent. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72165 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: rawnand: fix condition in 'nand_select_target()' 'cs' here must be in range [0:nanddev_ntargets[. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72164 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: avoid moving extents to occupied clusters For non-auto OCFS2_IOC_MOVE_EXT operations, userspace supplies a physical me_goal. ocfs2_move_extent() initializes new_phys_cpos from that goal and expects ocfs2_probe_alloc_group() to replace it with a free run in the target block group. The probe currently leaves *phys_cpos unchanged if the scan reaches the end of the group without finding a free run. An occupied goal at the last bit can therefore survive the probe and be passed to __ocfs2_move_extent(), which copies file data into a cluster still owned by another inode before the bitmap is updated. When the probe does find a free run, it also subtracts move_len from the ending bit. The start of an N-bit run ending at i is i - N + 1, so the current calculation can report the bit immediately before the free run. Clear *phys_cpos before scanning and use the correct free-run start. Callers already treat a zero result as -ENOSPC, so failed probes no longer continue with an occupied caller-controlled goal. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72163 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix NULL h_transaction deref in ocfs2_assure_trans_credits [BUG] A direct write over unwritten extents can panic the kernel in ocfs2_assure_trans_credits() when the journal aborts during DIO completion. The crash is a general protection fault from a NULL pointer dereference. [CAUSE] ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() loops over a direct write's unwritten extents, marking each written under a single journal handle. If the journal aborts (for example after an I/O error) while the extent tree is being updated, the handle is left aborted with its transaction pointer cleared. The extent merge treats that failure as not critical and reports success, so the loop keeps using the handle. ocfs2_assure_trans_credits() reads the handle's remaining credits without first checking whether the handle is aborted, and that read dereferences the cleared transaction pointer. [FIX] A journal abort is recorded in the handle itself, so callers are expected to test the handle rather than rely on a returned error. Make ocfs2_assure_trans_credits() do that, as the other ocfs2 journal helpers already do, and return -EROFS when the handle is aborted. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72161 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: add journal NULL check in ocfs2_checkpoint_inode() During unmount, ocfs2_journal_shutdown() frees the journal and sets osb->journal to NULL. Later, when VFS evicts remaining cached inodes, ocfs2_evict_inode() -> ocfs2_clear_inode() -> ocfs2_checkpoint_inode() -> ocfs2_ci_fully_checkpointed() dereferences osb->journal, causing a NULL pointer dereference. Fix this by adding a NULL check for osb->journal in ocfs2_checkpoint_inode(). If the journal is NULL, it has already been fully flushed and destroyed during shutdown, so there is nothing to checkpoint. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72160 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: reject dinodes with non-canonical i_mode type Patch series "ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata", v2. This series adds three structural checks to OCFS2 dinode validation so malformed on-disk fields are rejected before ocfs2_populate_inode() copies them into the in-core inode. The checks cover: - i_mode values whose type bits do not name a canonical POSIX file type; - non-device dinodes whose id1.dev1.i_rdev field is non-zero; and - non-inline dinodes that claim non-zero i_size while i_clusters is zero, covering directories unconditionally and regular files on non-sparse volumes. The normal read path reports these through ocfs2_error(), matching the existing suballoc-slot, inline-data, chain-list, and refcount checks. The online filecheck path uses the same structural predicates but keeps its own reporting contract, returning OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of calling ocfs2_error(). This patch (of 3): ocfs2_validate_inode_block() currently accepts any non-zero i_mode value. ocfs2_populate_inode() then copies that mode verbatim into inode->i_mode and dispatches on i_mode & S_IFMT to the file/dir/symlink/special_file iops; an unrecognised type falls through to ocfs2_special_file_iops and init_special_inode(). Reject dinodes whose type bits do not name one of the seven canonical POSIX file types. Use fs_umode_to_ftype(), the same generic file-type conversion helper OCFS2 already uses for directory entries, so the accepted inode type set matches the kernel file-type vocabulary instead of open-coding a local switch. Apply the same structural check to the online filecheck read path. filecheck keeps its own error namespace, so it reports malformed i_mode through the filecheck logger and OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of calling ocfs2_error(), but it must not allow a malformed dinode to proceed into ocfs2_populate_inode(). | |||||
| CVE-2026-72159 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: reject non-inline dinodes with i_size and zero i_clusters On a volume mounted without OCFS2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SPARSE_ALLOC, a non-inline regular file with non-zero i_size and zero i_clusters is structurally malformed: the extent map declares no allocated clusters yet the size header claims content exists. Keep rejecting that shape, but express it through a shared predicate so the same invariant is available to normal inode reads and online filecheck. The same zero-cluster shape is also malformed for non-inline directories. ocfs2 directory growth allocates backing storage before advancing i_size, and ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el() later walks until ctx->pos reaches i_size_read(inode). A forged directory dinode with a huge i_size and no clusters would repeatedly fail on holes while advancing through the claimed size. Sparse regular files remain exempt: on sparse-alloc volumes, truncate can legitimately grow i_size without allocating clusters. System inodes and inline-data dinodes also retain their separate storage rules. Mirror the check in ocfs2_filecheck_validate_inode_block() as well. filecheck reports through its own error namespace, so malformed size/cluster state is logged as a filecheck invalid-inode result rather than via ocfs2_error(), but it must not proceed into ocfs2_populate_inode(). | |||||
| CVE-2026-72158 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fpga: dfl: add bounds check in dfh_get_param_size() dfh_get_param_size() can return a parameter size larger than the feature region because the loop bounds check is evaluated before incrementing size. If the EOP (End of Parameters) bit is set in the same iteration, the inflated size is returned without re-validation against max. This can cause create_feature_instance() to call memcpy_fromio() with a size exceeding the ioremap'd region when a malicious FPGA device provides crafted DFHv1 parameter headers. Add a bounds check after the size increment to ensure the accumulated size never exceeds the feature boundary. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72156 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fpga: microchip-spi: fix zero header_size OOB read in mpf_ops_parse_header() mpf_ops_parse_header() reads header_size from the bitstream at MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET (24). When header_size is zero, the expression *(buf + header_size - 1) reads one byte before the buffer start. Since initial_header_size is set to 71 in mpf_ops, the fpga-mgr core guarantees the buffer is large enough to reach MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET. The only real gap is the zero header_size case, which cannot be resolved by providing a larger buffer, so return -EINVAL. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72154 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: openrisc: Fix jump_label smp syncing The original commit 8c30b0018f9d ("openrisc: Add jump label support") copies from arm64 and does not properly consider how icache invalidation on remote cores works in OpenRISC. On OpenRISC remote icaches need to be invalidated otherwise static key's may remain state after updating. Fix SMP cache syncing by: 1. Properly invalidate remote core icaches on SMP systems by using icache_all_inv. The old code uses kick_all_cpus_sync() which runs a no-op IPI function call on remote CPU's which does execute a lot of code and flushes many cache lines in the process, but does not flush all and it's not correct on OpenRISC. 2. For architectures that do not have WRITETHROUGH caches be sure to flush the dcache after patching. To test this I first reproduced the issue using a custom test module [0]. The test confirmed that some icache lines maintained stale static_key code sequences after calling static_branch_enable(). After this patch there are no longer jump_label coherency issues. [0] https://github.com/stffrdhrn/or1k-utils/tree/master/tests/smp_static_key_test | |||||
| CVE-2026-72153 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: irqchip/crossbar: Use correct index in crossbar_domain_free() crossbar_domain_free() resets the domain data and then uses the nulled out irq_data->hwirq member as index to reset the irq_map[] entry and to write the relevant crossbar register with a safe entry. That means it never frees the correct index and keeps the crossbar register connection to the source interrupt active. If it would not reset the domain data, then this would be even worse as irq_data->hwirq holds the source interrupt number, but both the map and register index need the corresponding GIC SPI number and not the source interrupt number. This might even result in an out of bounds access as the source interrupt number can be higher than the maximal index space. Fix this by using the GIC SPI index from the parent domain's irq_data. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72151 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | 8.4 HIGH | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tpm: tpm2-sessions: wait for async KPP completion in tpm_buf_append_salt tpm_buf_append_salt() in drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c calls crypto_kpp_generate_public_key() and crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret() without installing a completion callback, discards both return values, and immediately frees the kpp_request via kpp_request_free(). When the resolved ecdh-nist-p256 KPP backend is asynchronous (atmel-ecc, HPRE, keembay-ocs), either operation returns -EINPROGRESS and the deferred completion worker dereferences the freed request. The path fires automatically from the hwrng_fillfn kernel thread via tpm_get_random -> tpm2_get_random -> tpm2_start_auth_session -> tpm_buf_append_salt on every entropy poll, without any userland action. Install crypto_req_done as the completion callback, wrap both KPP operations in crypto_wait_req(), and propagate errors to the caller. The wait is a no-op for synchronous backends. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72149 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: tegra: Fix burst size calculation Currently, the Tegra GPC DMA hardware requires the transfer length to be a multiple of the max burst size configured for the channel. When a client requests a transfer where the length is not evenly divisible by the configured max burst size, the DMA hangs with partial burst at the end. Fix this by reducing the burst size to the largest power-of-2 value that evenly divides the transfer length. For example, a 40-byte transfer with a 16-byte max burst will now use an 8-byte burst (40 / 8 = 5 complete bursts) instead of causing a hang. This issue was observed with the PL011 UART driver where TX DMA transfers of arbitrary lengths were stuck. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72147 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: dw-edma-pcie: Reject devices without driver data dw_edma_pcie_probe() treats the PCI device ID driver_data as the template for the controller layout and copies it unconditionally. A device bound dynamically via sysfs can match the driver without that data, which leads to a NULL pointer dereference. Reject such matches before enabling the device. | |||||
| CVE-2026-72145 | 2026-08-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86/intel/tpmi: use cleanup helpers in mem_write() In mem_write(), the temporary array returned by parse_int_array_user() must be released on all exit paths. Convert the array variable to use cleanup.h scope-based cleanup so it is freed automatically on return. This also moves the array declaration next to parse_int_array_user() as required by cleanup.h usage guidelines. | |||||