Total
850 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-50634 | 1 Apache | 1 Cxf | 2026-08-07 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| A vulnerability in Apache CXF's JwsJsonContainerRequestFilter can be exploited to cause CXF to process metadata that was not authenticated by the accepted signature. This can bypass the application's assumption that accepted `Content-Type` or protected HTTP-header metadata came from a verified signature entry, and may steer downstream JAX-RS entity parsing or signed-header consistency checks. Users are recommended to upgrade to versions 4.2.2 or 4.1.7 or 3.6.12, which fix this issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-15013 | 2026-08-07 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL | ||
| The SAML Single Sign On – SSO Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SAML Signature Algorithm Confusion in all versions up to, and including, 5.4.3. The vulnerability exists because `Mo_SAML_Utilities::mo_saml_cast_key()` reads the `SignatureMethod` Algorithm attribute directly from the attacker-controlled `SAMLResponse` parameter rather than enforcing the locally configured algorithm, causing the plugin to recast the IdP's RSA public key as an HMAC-SHA1 shared secret and validate the forged signature against it. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to forge a SAML assertion targeting any WordPress account — including administrators — obtain valid WordPress authentication cookies, and achieve full administrator-level account takeover. | |||||
| CVE-2026-18092 | 1 Timlegge | 1 Net\ | 2026-08-06 | N/A | 8.1 HIGH |
| Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree. new_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature's Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker's NameID and attributes. Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user. | |||||
| CVE-2026-18108 | 1 Timlegge | 1 Net\ | 2026-08-06 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content carries no signature. _verify_encrypted_assertion decrypts the EncryptedAssertion and returns it as verified when it carries no signature, via "return $xml unless $xpath->exists('dsig:Signature', $assert);". The signature check and the trust anchor check that follow run only when a signature is present, so a decrypted assertion with no dsig:Signature element reaches new_from_xml unverified and its NameID and attributes are read into the assertion object. An SP's encryption certificate is published in its SAML metadata so the IdP can encrypt to it, so any party can encrypt an unsigned assertion to that certificate, wrap it in a samlp:Response, and post it to the assertion consumer service. Any caller that configures a decryption key_file, and so accepts EncryptedAssertions, takes identity fields from an assertion that no trust anchor covers, and an unauthenticated party can authenticate as an arbitrary user. Callers with no key_file configured do not decrypt and are unaffected. | |||||
| CVE-2026-18089 | 1 Timlegge | 1 Net\ | 2026-08-06 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass by verifying responses against the response-embedded certificate in verify_xml when no trust anchor is configured. verify_xml in Net::SAML2::Role::VerifyXML runs "return if !$anchors && !$cacert;" as soon as the XML::Sig check succeeds, and that check uses the X.509 certificate taken from the response's own dsig:KeyInfo/dsig:X509Certificate element, so an unanchored response is checked only against the key it carries. Binding::POST declares cacert as an optional Maybe[Str] with no default, so a POST binding built without one takes that path, and _verify_encrypted_assertion returns early the same way with "return $xml unless $cacert;". Any caller that constructs Binding::POST or calls Assertion->new_from_xml without a cacert, cert_text, or anchors argument accepts a response signed by an attacker generated key whose self-signed certificate is embedded in that response, authenticating an arbitrary assertion. | |||||
| CVE-2026-55735 | 1 Ueberauth | 1 Guardian | 2026-08-06 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in ueberauth guardian allows an unauthenticated attacker to revoke a victim's session with a forged token. Guardian.revoke/3 in lib/guardian.ex decodes the supplied token with peek/1, which performs no signature verification (it only base64-decodes the JWT header and payload). The resulting unverified claims are forwarded directly to the configured token module's revoke callback and the implementation's on_revoke callback, a state-mutating sink. The sibling operations refresh/2 and exchange/4 both call decode_and_verify first, so the signature is checked before anything acts on the claims; revoke/3 is the only state-mutating path that acts on claims without verifying the signature. An attacker who knows or guesses a victim's identifying claim values (jti, sub) can forge a JWT carrying those claims, sign it with an arbitrary key, and submit it to any endpoint that funnels a caller-supplied token into Guardian.revoke/3 (the standard logout / session-revocation pattern). When the token module mutates state keyed by the claims (whitelist deletion or blacklist insertion, for example a GuardianDb-style store), the victim's legitimate session is evicted. This is an unauthenticated session-revocation denial of service; the attacker never needs the signing secret. This issue affects guardian: from 1.0.0 before 2.4.1. | |||||
| CVE-2026-18568 | 1 Xml\ | 1 \ | 2026-08-05 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| XML::Sig versions from 0.29 before 0.72 for Perl allow signature verification bypass because verify returns true when every signature was skipped before any cryptographic check. verify in lib/XML/Sig.pm counts the `//dsig:Signature` elements into `$numsigs` and iterates over them, but two paths reach `next` before any digest or key check runs: a `SignedInfo/Reference/@URI` that resolves to no element while `$numsigs` is greater than 1, and, when `id_attr` is set, a reference that does not match the requested ID. The loop records nothing about what it checked, so when every signature takes one of those paths control reaches the unconditional `return 1` that ends verify. Two `Signature` elements whose Reference URI names an ID that no element carries is enough, as is one such element combined with `id_attr`. Any caller that passes untrusted XML to verify can receive a true return for a document in which no digest and no signature value was checked; a `cert` or `cert_text` trust anchor does not change this, because no key check runs. Versions up to 0.28 use an XML::XPath based verify that has no such skip and are not affected. | |||||
| CVE-2026-9487 | 1 Xml\ | 1 \ | 2026-08-05 | N/A | 9.1 CRITICAL |
| XML::Sig versions before 0.71 for Perl allow signature wrapping via duplicate ID. _get_signed_xml() in lib/XML/Sig.pm, called from verify(), resolves the SignedInfo Reference/@URI to a node with the XPath expression "//*[@ID='$id']" and returns the first node of the resulting node set. A document in which two elements share that ID value is accepted: the digest and signature are checked against whichever element comes first in document order, and the duplicate is not detected. Such a document verifies successfully while an application that resolves the same ID independently can read the second, attacker supplied element; in a SAML2 context this places the contents of an Assertion under attacker control. | |||||
| CVE-2024-8698 | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.7 HIGH | ||
| A flaw exists in the SAML signature validation method within the Keycloak XMLSignatureUtil class. The method incorrectly determines whether a SAML signature is for the full document or only for specific assertions based on the position of the signature in the XML document, rather than the Reference element used to specify the signed element. This flaw allows attackers to create crafted responses that can bypass the validation, potentially leading to privilege escalation or impersonation attacks. | |||||
| CVE-2026-17872 | 1 Google | 2 Android, Chrome | 2026-08-03 | N/A | 6.1 MEDIUM |
| Cryptographic Flaw in WebAppInstalls in Google Chrome on Android prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a local attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) | |||||
| CVE-2026-48021 | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 9.1 CRITICAL | ||
| In epa4all, prior to version 2026-05-20, an attacker who can intercept the TLS connection between epa4all and the ePA backend can complete the VAU handshake with attacker-controlled keys and obtain the session encryption keys. All inner HTTP traffic (patient consent decisions, medication data, document operations, authorization tokens, and entitlement queries) becomes readable and modifiable. The attacker can also inject arbitrary requests through the hijacked channel. This issue has been patched in version 2026-05-20. | |||||
| CVE-2026-13305 | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 6.4 MEDIUM | ||
| Autel MaxiCharger AC Elite Home Software Update Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows physically present attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Autel MaxiCharger AC Elite Home EV chargers. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the handling of software updates. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied software update image. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the device. Was ZDI-CAN-29062. | |||||
| CVE-2026-63237 | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 4.8 MEDIUM | ||
| A TOTP two-factor authentication bypass vulnerability in Koollab LMS allowed an attacker to supply a client-controlled seed to generate a matching one-time password and bypass the second authentication factor, potentially enabling unauthorised access to administrator accounts. | |||||
| CVE-2026-44104 | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL | ||
| The firmware update process for the basemodule of the charging controller only validates the CRC32 checksum without cryptographic signature verification. This allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to install a modified firmware, resulting in full system compromise. | |||||
| CVE-2026-65616 | 1 Jfrog | 1 Artifactory | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| Incorrect authorization validation in refresh token signature allows non-admin users to obtain a signed JFrog administrator token. | |||||
| CVE-2026-14837 | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH | ||
| Multiple Lenze products are affected by an improper signature verification vulnerability in the SSH enablement mechanism. A low-privileged local attacker can bypass verification of the SSH enable file signature and enable SSH access on the device. Successful exploitation may result in unauthorized administrative access and complete system compromise. | |||||
| CVE-2026-49834 | 1 Sigstore | 1 Sigstore-go | 2026-07-30 | N/A | 5.9 MEDIUM |
| sigstore-go is a Go library for Sigstore signing and verification. Prior to 1.2.0, a verifier configured with WithTransparencyLog(N>1) or WithSignedCertificateTimestamps(N>1) counts verified witnesses per entry or per validation path rather than per log authority, allowing a single compromised transparency log or CT log to satisfy multi-log threshold requirements and defeat the multi-log policy. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.0. | |||||
| CVE-2026-4258 | 1 Bitwiseshiftleft | 1 Stanford Javascript Crypto Library | 2026-07-28 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Versions of the package sjcl before 1.0.9 are vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature due to missing point-on-curve validation in sjcl.ecc.basicKey.publicKey(). An attacker can recover a victim's ECDH private key by sending crafted off-curve public keys and observing ECDH outputs. The dhJavaEc() function directly returns the raw x-coordinate of the scalar multiplication result (no hashing), providing a plaintext oracle without requiring any decryption feedback. | |||||
| CVE-2026-13089 | 2026-07-27 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH | ||
| OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify. When the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self->alg($self->header->{alg}) from the token's own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self->alg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields ['none'], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP's RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion). The ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)->verify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self->alg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected. Note that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository. | |||||
| CVE-2026-33467 | 1 Elastic | 1 Elastic Package Registry | 2026-07-24 | N/A | 5.9 MEDIUM |
| Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature (CWE-347) in Elastic Package Registry could allow an attacker positioned to intercept network traffic, or to otherwise influence the contents served to a self-hosted registry, to substitute a tampered package without the integrity check failing closed. | |||||