Dancer2 versions before 2.2.0 for Perl do not strip CR and LF from response header names in headers_to_array.
The routine removes CR and LF from each header value but not from the name. A name carrying them therefore reaches the PSGI server intact. A server that does not validate keys writes it to the wire, so the bytes after the CRLF arrive as their own header line.
The application has to derive the header name from request data, not just the value.
An attacker who controls that data adds their own headers and splits the response.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
22 Sep 2026, 20:17
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| CVSS |
v2 : v3 : |
v2 : unknown
v3 : 6.5 |
22 Sep 2026, 03:16
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
22 Sep 2026, 01:16
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-09-22 01:16
Updated : 2026-09-22 20:17
NVD link : CVE-2026-93711
Mitre link : CVE-2026-93711
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-93711
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
CWE-113
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting')
