CVE-2026-82018

IGEL OS 12 before 12.9.0, 12.8.3 LTS and IGEL OS 11 before 11.11.150 contain a secure boot bypass vulnerability in the GRUB boot stage that allows physically present attackers to gain unauthorized root access by placing an unsigned empty file named igel.conf on a partition. Attackers can exploit GRUB's fail-open signature verification behavior to drop into an interactive GRUB prompt, then boot the device's own kernel with additional command-line arguments to obtain a root shell with the disk unlocked while leaving TPM PCR values unaltered.

CVSS v3 6.1 MEDIUM

6.1^/10

CVSS v3 : MEDIUM

Vector :

Exploitability : 0.9 / Impact : 5.2

Attack Vector PHYSICAL

Attack Complexity LOW

Privileges Required NONE

User Interaction NONE

Confidentiality Impact HIGH

Integrity Impact HIGH

Availability Impact NONE

Scope UNCHANGED

References

Link	Resource
https://blog.amberwolf.com/blog/2026/august/thin-client-thin-crypto-overview/
https://kb.igel.com/en/security-safety/current/isn-2026-20-grub-shell-escape-in-igel-os
https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2034/DEF%20CON%2034%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2034%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2034%20-%20Darren%20McDonald%20-%20Thin%20Client%20Thin%20Crypto%20-%20Bypassing%20Full-Desk%20Encryption%20Across%20Three%20Major%20Thin%20Clients%20Vendors%20without%20Breaking%20a%20Ci.pdf
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/igel-os-12-11-secure-boot-bypass-via-unsigned-igel-conf-file

Configurations

No configuration.

History

No history.

Information

Published : 2026-08-28 22:16

Updated : 2026-09-02 19:18

NVD link : CVE-2026-82018

Mitre link : CVE-2026-82018

CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-82018

JSON object : View

Products Affected

No product.

CWE

CWE-636

Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open')

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