PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.110 to before version 4.6.61, praisonai.sandbox.SandlockSandbox is documented and implemented as the kernel-enforced sandbox backend for untrusted code. Its SandboxConfig.native() path lets callers configure allowed filesystem paths and network=False. On systems where the optional sandlock module imports but reports that Landlock is unavailable, SandlockSandbox.execute() and run_command() do not fail closed. They silently fall back to SubprocessSandbox(self.config). That fallback keeps the same high-level native policy object but does not enforce the native filesystem or network boundary during code execution. A sandboxed payload can read files outside the configured allowed path and open network connections despite network=False. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
29 Oct 2026, 04:18
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References | () https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-6jcq-6546-qrrw - |
23 Oct 2026, 13:17
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-10-23 13:17
Updated : 2026-10-29 04:18
NVD link : CVE-2026-57144
Mitre link : CVE-2026-57144
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-57144
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
