Serendipity is a PHP-powered weblog engine. In versions 2.6-beta2 and below, the email sending functionality in include/functions.inc.php inserts $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] directly into the Message-ID SMTP header without validation, and the existing sanitization function serendipity_isResponseClean() is not called on HTTP_HOST before embedding it. An attacker who can control the Host header during an email-triggering action such as comment notifications or subscription emails can inject arbitrary SMTP headers into outgoing emails. This enables identity spoofing, reply hijacking via manipulated Message-ID threading, and email reputation abuse through the attacker's domain being embedded in legitimate mail headers. This issue has been fixed in version 2.6.0.
References
| Link | Resource |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/s9y/Serendipity/releases/tag/2.6.0 | Patch |
| https://github.com/s9y/Serendipity/security/advisories/GHSA-458g-q4fh-mj6r | Exploit Mitigation Vendor Advisory |
Configurations
Configuration 1 (hide)
|
History
No history.
Information
Published : 2026-04-15 04:17
Updated : 2026-06-17 10:42
NVD link : CVE-2026-39971
Mitre link : CVE-2026-39971
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-39971
JSON object : View
Products Affected
s9y
- serendipity
CWE
CWE-113
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting')
