Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.
The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.
This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.
CVSS
No CVSS.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
26 Oct 2026, 14:16
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-10-26 14:16
Updated : 2026-10-26 16:59
NVD link : CVE-2026-112880
Mitre link : CVE-2026-112880
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-112880
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
CWE-113
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting')