Total
414919 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-97886 | 2026-09-29 | 6.5 MEDIUM | 6.3 MEDIUM | ||
| A vulnerability has been found in mathurvishal CloudClassroom-PHP-Project up to 5dadec098bfbbf3300d60c3494db3fb95b66e7be. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file managevideos2.php. Such manipulation of the argument editassid leads to sql injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. This product operates on a rolling release basis, ensuring continuous delivery. Consequently, there are no version details for either affected or updated releases. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. | |||||
| CVE-2026-97060 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | 7.2 HIGH | ||
| X-SpringBoot through 6.0 lacks object-level authorization in user management endpoints, allowing sub-administrators to modify or delete users without ownership verification. Attackers with user-management permissions can reset passwords for any account including the super administrator, rebind roles, or delete users via POST /sys/user/update and POST /sys/user/delete endpoints. | |||||
| CVE-2026-18117 | 1 Concretecms | 1 Concrete Cms | 2026-09-29 | N/A | 5.4 MEDIUM |
| Concrete CMS 9.0.0 through 9.5.3 is vulnerable to stored XSS via the custom page alias name (customAliasName) because the Edit Alias dialog applied only trim() to the submitted value and performed no input neutralization. An authenticated user holding canWrite (editor) permission on a page could store a malicious alias name that was later rendered unescaped in the administrative Sitemap panel, where it executed automatically in any administrator or editor session that opened the panel, allowing an editor to escalate to administrator through the victim's active session. The Concrete CMS security team gave this vulnerability a CVSS v4.0 score of 7.3 with vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N. Thanks Nguyen Manh Thuan for reporting. | |||||
| CVE-2026-85417 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| Incomplete property masking in the SANnav logging subsystem permits SNMP authentication and privacy passwords to be recorded in application logs under specific configuration conditions. Individuals with read access to system logs or support bundles can retrieve these credentials, leading to unauthorized read or management access to monitored switch environments | |||||
| CVE-2026-84465 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.1.2, when Zammad checks the digital signature on an incoming S/MIME-signed email, it does not verify that the signing certificate is genuinely trusted, it only checks whether a certificate with a matching name is already stored in the system. An attacker can create their own certificate using the name of a real, previously trusted sender and use it to send a forged email. Zammad will display that email with the same "validly signed" indicator as a genuine message from the real sender, even though the attacker never had access to that sender's actual certificate or private key. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.2. | |||||
| CVE-2026-84460 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.1.2, any authenticated user can call the REST endpoint for getting a tag list and receive the tag names for the given ticket, regardless of whether they have access to that ticket. Tags are an internal categorization feature and may contain sensitive labels. Ticket IDs are sequential integers, making bulk enumeration straightforward. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.2. | |||||
| CVE-2026-63207 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. In 7.0.3 and 7.1.1, an authenticated administrator can obtain stored integration credentials in cleartext through the integration administration API. Certain responses do not consistently mask sensitive fields, so configured secrets can be returned in plain text instead of the expected masked placeholder. Both the LDAP and Exchange integrations are affected. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.2. | |||||
| CVE-2026-63006 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.1.2, attacker-controlled HTML in inbound emails or tickets could bypass the image URL sanitizer using path traversal sequences. When an authenticated agent views the content, the browser resolves the URL to a protected API endpoint and sends the request with the agent's session cookie, enabling side effects such as forced logout without any user interaction. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.2. | |||||
| CVE-2026-17107 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | 8.5 HIGH | ||
| A flaw was found in the cluster-proxy service-proxy component used in Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes (RHACM) and multicluster-engine (MCE). The service-proxy appends impersonation group headers to proxied requests without first removing caller-supplied values, and the spoke ServiceAccount holds unrestricted impersonation permissions. An authenticated hub principal can inject an Impersonate-Group header to escalate to cluster-admin on every managed cluster. | |||||
| CVE-2026-102730 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| Mounting an attacker-controlled NAND flash image (`lx_nand_flash_open()`) triggers an unbounded out-of-bounds heap **write** in LevelX's NAND flash-translation-layer metadata parser that overwrites a driver function pointer in the control block, giving a demonstrated control-flow hijack — RIP set to a full 8-byte attacker-chosen value (register-verified). Two accompanying OOB reads. All reproduced verbatim under ASan at HEAD `9f1cfdc`. (The affected metadata-parser header states "Some portions generated by Copilot (Sonnet 4.6)" — an AI-generated parser with an unchecked on-flash count.) | |||||
| CVE-2026-102729 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| `gx_binres_theme_load()` sizes its theme buffer for the theme it was asked for, and allocates it even when the resource holds no theme with that id. A theme id at or past the theme count declared by the resource gets a buffer of zero bytes. The load pass then walks past the end of the theme table, takes whatever follows as a theme header, and writes a `GX_THEME` and its tables into that zero-byte buffer. | |||||
| CVE-2026-102727 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| FTP Passive Data Connection Not Bound to the Authenticated Control Peer | |||||
| CVE-2026-102726 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| Unbounded PPP IPCP Option Parsing Causes a Worker Stall and Out-of-bounds Read | |||||
| CVE-2026-102725 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| Out-of-bounds Read from Unvalidated MSRP Attribute List Length | |||||
| CVE-2026-102724 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| NULL Pointer Dereference When Evicting the Sole MSRP Attribute | |||||
| CVE-2026-81522 | 1 Mongodb | 1 C\+\+ Driver | 2026-09-29 | N/A | 8.1 HIGH |
| A weakness in the MongoDB C++ Driver's handling of caller-supplied namespace identifiers allows special characters embedded in those identifiers. An application that builds a namespace identifier from untrusted input without validating it may therefore have its operation directed at a different target than intended. This can result in limited unauthorized read and write access to data belonging to another logical tenant of the affected application. | |||||
| CVE-2026-102723 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| NULL Pointer Dereference on MSRP Attribute Table Exhaustion | |||||
| CVE-2026-102722 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the IPv4 PASV path, the FTP Client accepts whatever address was sent in the server's `227` reply. Validation only covers the parse and the non-zero values, thus a malicious server can name any address and direct the Client there. | |||||
| CVE-2026-102721 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| A TFTP server that answers with a short ERROR packet makes the client read up to 64 bytes past the received datagram. Each receive path checks only that the datagram is at least four bytes long (nxd_tftp_client.c:1229, 1521, 1984). When the opcode is NX_TFTP_CODE_ERROR the message string is copied with a loop whose only limits are the destination buffer and a NUL byte: ```c /* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_client.c:1769 */ for (i = 0; (i < (sizeof(tftp_client_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_error_string) - 1)) && (*buffer_ptr); i++) ``` Nothing compares `buffer_ptr` against `nx_packet_append_ptr`. An ERROR packet that carries no terminating NUL, which a server controls completely, walks the loop off the end of the packet until it happens to meet a zero byte or fills the 64 byte destination. ``` ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1 at 0x60d0000000c8 thread T4 #0 _nxd_tftp_client_file_read addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_client.c:1769 0x60d0000000c8 is 0 bytes to the right of 136-byte region ``` The open path has the same loop at :1327 and reports the same way. What is read lands in `nx_tftp_client_error_string`, which the application is expected to display or log, so adjacent packet pool memory ends up in whatever the device does with the error text. Add `(buffer_ptr < packet_ptr -> nx_packet_append_ptr)` to the loop condition in all three paths. | |||||
| CVE-2026-102720 | 2026-09-29 | N/A | N/A | ||
| A DHCP server, or anyone on the LAN who answers a DISCOVER first, can make the client read about a kilobyte past the end of the received message. The option walk keeps a pointer and an offset in step, and the only bound check uses the offset: ```c /* addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7538, 7572 */ while (i < length - 1) { ... size = *(++data); /* data moves 1: type -> length byte */ data += size + 1; /* data moves size + 1 more */ i += size + 1; /* i moves only size + 1 */ } ``` A TLV option occupies size + 2 bytes. `data` is advanced by size + 2 in total, `i` by size + 1, so the offset falls one byte behind the real read position for every option the walk skips. After enough skipped options the check `i < length - 1` still holds while `data` is already past the end of the message, and the subsequent read of the type and length bytes comes from whatever follows. A single OFFER carrying a long run of skippable options is enough: ``` ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1 at 0x61b000000794 thread T5 #0 _nx_dhcp_search_buffer addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7541 #1 _nx_dhcp_get_option_value addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7082 0x61b000000794 is located 164 bytes to the right of 1648-byte region ``` A well formed OFFER through the same path is handled normally, the client records the offer and moves to REQUESTING, so the difference is the option layout rather than the harness. The read runs in the DHCP client thread while the client is still unconfigured, so it happens on every boot in reach of a hostile DHCP responder. The values read are used to configure the interface, which is how the disclosed bytes become observable. Advance `i` by size + 2, or derive the bound from `data` rather than keeping a second counter. | |||||