Total
401074 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-26779 | 2 Debian, Linux | 2 Debian Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: fix race condition on enabling fast-xmit fast-xmit must only be enabled after the sta has been uploaded to the driver, otherwise it could end up passing the not-yet-uploaded sta via drv_tx calls to the driver, leading to potential crashes because of uninitialized drv_priv data. Add a missing sta->uploaded check and re-check fast xmit after inserting a sta. | |||||
| CVE-2024-26773 | 2 Debian, Linux | 2 Debian Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: avoid allocating blocks from corrupted group in ext4_mb_try_best_found() Determine if the group block bitmap is corrupted before using ac_b_ex in ext4_mb_try_best_found() to avoid allocating blocks from a group with a corrupted block bitmap in the following concurrency and making the situation worse. ext4_mb_regular_allocator ext4_lock_group(sb, group) ext4_mb_good_group // check if the group bbitmap is corrupted ext4_mb_complex_scan_group // Scan group gets ac_b_ex but doesn't use it ext4_unlock_group(sb, group) ext4_mark_group_bitmap_corrupted(group) // The block bitmap was corrupted during // the group unlock gap. ext4_mb_try_best_found ext4_lock_group(ac->ac_sb, group) ext4_mb_use_best_found mb_mark_used // Allocating blocks in block bitmap corrupted group | |||||
| CVE-2024-26772 | 2 Debian, Linux | 2 Debian Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: avoid allocating blocks from corrupted group in ext4_mb_find_by_goal() Places the logic for checking if the group's block bitmap is corrupt under the protection of the group lock to avoid allocating blocks from the group with a corrupted block bitmap. | |||||
| CVE-2024-26769 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-fc: avoid deadlock on delete association path When deleting an association the shutdown path is deadlocking because we try to flush the nvmet_wq nested. Avoid this by deadlock by deferring the put work into its own work item. | |||||
| CVE-2024-26768 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.2 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: Change acpi_core_pic[NR_CPUS] to acpi_core_pic[MAX_CORE_PIC] With default config, the value of NR_CPUS is 64. When HW platform has more then 64 cpus, system will crash on these platforms. MAX_CORE_PIC is the maximum cpu number in MADT table (max physical number) which can exceed the supported maximum cpu number (NR_CPUS, max logical number), but kernel should not crash. Kernel should boot cpus with NR_CPUS, let the remainder cpus stay in BIOS. The potential crash reason is that the array acpi_core_pic[NR_CPUS] can be overflowed when parsing MADT table, and it is obvious that CORE_PIC should be corresponding to physical core rather than logical core, so it is better to define the array as acpi_core_pic[MAX_CORE_PIC]. With the patch, system can boot up 64 vcpus with qemu parameter -smp 128, otherwise system will crash with the following message. [ 0.000000] CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000420000004259, era == 90000000037a5f0c, ra == 90000000037a46ec [ 0.000000] Oops[#1]: [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2+ #192 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 [ 0.000000] pc 90000000037a5f0c ra 90000000037a46ec tp 9000000003c90000 sp 9000000003c93d60 [ 0.000000] a0 0000000000000019 a1 9000000003d93bc0 a2 0000000000000000 a3 9000000003c93bd8 [ 0.000000] a4 9000000003c93a74 a5 9000000083c93a67 a6 9000000003c938f0 a7 0000000000000005 [ 0.000000] t0 0000420000004201 t1 0000000000000000 t2 0000000000000001 t3 0000000000000001 [ 0.000000] t4 0000000000000003 t5 0000000000000000 t6 0000000000000030 t7 0000000000000063 [ 0.000000] t8 0000000000000014 u0 ffffffffffffffff s9 0000000000000000 s0 9000000003caee98 [ 0.000000] s1 90000000041b0480 s2 9000000003c93da0 s3 9000000003c93d98 s4 9000000003c93d90 [ 0.000000] s5 9000000003caa000 s6 000000000a7fd000 s7 000000000f556b60 s8 000000000e0a4330 [ 0.000000] ra: 90000000037a46ec platform_init+0x214/0x250 [ 0.000000] ERA: 90000000037a5f0c efi_runtime_init+0x30/0x94 [ 0.000000] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) [ 0.000000] PRMD: 00000000 (PPLV0 -PIE -PWE) [ 0.000000] EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE) [ 0.000000] ECFG: 00070800 (LIE=11 VS=7) [ 0.000000] ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0) [ 0.000000] BADV: 0000420000004259 [ 0.000000] PRID: 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A5000) [ 0.000000] Modules linked in: [ 0.000000] Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=(____ptrval____), task=(____ptrval____)) [ 0.000000] Stack : 9000000003c93a14 9000000003800898 90000000041844f8 90000000037a46ec [ 0.000000] 000000000a7fd000 0000000008290000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000019d8000 000000000f556b60 [ 0.000000] 000000000a7fd000 000000000f556b08 9000000003ca7700 9000000003800000 [ 0.000000] 9000000003c93e50 9000000003800898 9000000003800108 90000000037a484c [ 0.000000] 000000000e0a4330 000000000f556b60 000000000a7fd000 000000000f556b08 [ 0.000000] 9000000003ca7700 9000000004184000 0000000000200000 000000000e02b018 [ 0.000000] 000000000a7fd000 90000000037a0790 9000000003800108 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] 0000000000000000 000000000e0a4330 000000000f556b60 000000000a7fd000 [ 0.000000] 000000000f556b08 000000000eaae298 000000000eaa5040 0000000000200000 [ 0.000000] ... [ 0.000000] Call Trace: [ 0.000000] [<90000000037a5f0c>] efi_runtime_init+0x30/0x94 [ 0.000000] [<90000000037a46ec>] platform_init+0x214/0x250 [ 0.000000] [<90000000037a484c>] setup_arch+0x124/0x45c [ 0.000000] [<90000000037a0790>] start_kernel+0x90/0x670 [ 0.000000] [<900000000378b0d8>] kernel_entry+0xd8/0xdc | |||||
| CVE-2024-26766 | 2 Debian, Linux | 2 Debian Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/hfi1: Fix sdma.h tx->num_descs off-by-one error Unfortunately the commit `fd8958efe877` introduced another error causing the `descs` array to overflow. This reults in further crashes easily reproducible by `sendmsg` system call. [ 1080.836473] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x400300015528b00a: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 1080.869326] RIP: 0010:hfi1_ipoib_build_ib_tx_headers.constprop.0+0xe1/0x2b0 [hfi1] -- [ 1080.974535] Call Trace: [ 1080.976990] <TASK> [ 1081.021929] hfi1_ipoib_send_dma_common+0x7a/0x2e0 [hfi1] [ 1081.027364] hfi1_ipoib_send_dma_list+0x62/0x270 [hfi1] [ 1081.032633] hfi1_ipoib_send+0x112/0x300 [hfi1] [ 1081.042001] ipoib_start_xmit+0x2a9/0x2d0 [ib_ipoib] [ 1081.046978] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc4/0x210 -- [ 1081.148347] __sys_sendmsg+0x59/0xa0 crash> ipoib_txreq 0xffff9cfeba229f00 struct ipoib_txreq { txreq = { list = { next = 0xffff9cfeba229f00, prev = 0xffff9cfeba229f00 }, descp = 0xffff9cfeba229f40, coalesce_buf = 0x0, wait = 0xffff9cfea4e69a48, complete = 0xffffffffc0fe0760 <hfi1_ipoib_sdma_complete>, packet_len = 0x46d, tlen = 0x0, num_desc = 0x0, desc_limit = 0x6, next_descq_idx = 0x45c, coalesce_idx = 0x0, flags = 0x0, descs = {{ qw = {0x8024000120dffb00, 0x4} # SDMA_DESC0_FIRST_DESC_FLAG (bit 63) }, { qw = { 0x3800014231b108, 0x4} }, { qw = { 0x310000e4ee0fcf0, 0x8} }, { qw = { 0x3000012e9f8000, 0x8} }, { qw = { 0x59000dfb9d0000, 0x8} }, { qw = { 0x78000e02e40000, 0x8} }} }, sdma_hdr = 0x400300015528b000, <<< invalid pointer in the tx request structure sdma_status = 0x0, SDMA_DESC0_LAST_DESC_FLAG (bit 62) complete = 0x0, priv = 0x0, txq = 0xffff9cfea4e69880, skb = 0xffff9d099809f400 } If an SDMA send consists of exactly 6 descriptors and requires dword padding (in the 7th descriptor), the sdma_txreq descriptor array is not properly expanded and the packet will overflow into the container structure. This results in a panic when the send completion runs. The exact panic varies depending on what elements of the container structure get corrupted. The fix is to use the correct expression in _pad_sdma_tx_descs() to test the need to expand the descriptor array. With this patch the crashes are no longer reproducible and the machine is stable. | |||||
| CVE-2024-26763 | 2 Debian, Linux | 2 Debian Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.1 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-crypt: don't modify the data when using authenticated encryption It was said that authenticated encryption could produce invalid tag when the data that is being encrypted is modified [1]. So, fix this problem by copying the data into the clone bio first and then encrypt them inside the clone bio. This may reduce performance, but it is needed to prevent the user from corrupting the device by writing data with O_DIRECT and modifying them at the same time. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240207004723.GA35324@sol.localdomain/T/ | |||||
| CVE-2024-26762 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/pci: Skip to handle RAS errors if CXL.mem device is detached The PCI AER model is an awkward fit for CXL error handling. While the expectation is that a PCI device can escalate to link reset to recover from an AER event, the same reset on CXL amounts to a surprise memory hotplug of massive amounts of memory. At present, the CXL error handler attempts some optimistic error handling to unbind the device from the cxl_mem driver after reaping some RAS register values. This results in a "hopeful" attempt to unplug the memory, but there is no guarantee that will succeed. A subsequent AER notification after the memdev unbind event can no longer assume the registers are mapped. Check for memdev bind before reaping status register values to avoid crashes of the form: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffa00000195e9100 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [...] RIP: 0010:__cxl_handle_ras+0x30/0x110 [cxl_core] [...] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x24/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x82/0x160 ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x84/0x110 ? exc_page_fault+0x113/0x170 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? __pfx_dpc_reset_link+0x10/0x10 ? __cxl_handle_ras+0x30/0x110 [cxl_core] ? find_cxl_port+0x59/0x80 [cxl_core] cxl_handle_rp_ras+0xbc/0xd0 [cxl_core] cxl_error_detected+0x6c/0xf0 [cxl_core] report_error_detected+0xc7/0x1c0 pci_walk_bus+0x73/0x90 pcie_do_recovery+0x23f/0x330 Longer term, the unbind and PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT behavior might need to be replaced with a new PCI_ERS_RESULT_PANIC. | |||||
| CVE-2024-26760 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 9.8 CRITICAL |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: pscsi: Fix bio_put() for error case As of commit 066ff571011d ("block: turn bio_kmalloc into a simple kmalloc wrapper"), a bio allocated by bio_kmalloc() must be freed by bio_uninit() and kfree(). That is not done properly for the error case, hitting WARN and NULL pointer dereference in bio_free(). | |||||
| CVE-2024-26759 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/swap: fix race when skipping swapcache When skipping swapcache for SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO, if two or more threads swapin the same entry at the same time, they get different pages (A, B). Before one thread (T0) finishes the swapin and installs page (A) to the PTE, another thread (T1) could finish swapin of page (B), swap_free the entry, then swap out the possibly modified page reusing the same entry. It breaks the pte_same check in (T0) because PTE value is unchanged, causing ABA problem. Thread (T0) will install a stalled page (A) into the PTE and cause data corruption. One possible callstack is like this: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- do_swap_page() do_swap_page() with same entry <direct swapin path> <direct swapin path> <alloc page A> <alloc page B> swap_read_folio() <- read to page A swap_read_folio() <- read to page B <slow on later locks or interrupt> <finished swapin first> ... set_pte_at() swap_free() <- entry is free <write to page B, now page A stalled> <swap out page B to same swap entry> pte_same() <- Check pass, PTE seems unchanged, but page A is stalled! swap_free() <- page B content lost! set_pte_at() <- staled page A installed! And besides, for ZRAM, swap_free() allows the swap device to discard the entry content, so even if page (B) is not modified, if swap_read_folio() on CPU0 happens later than swap_free() on CPU1, it may also cause data loss. To fix this, reuse swapcache_prepare which will pin the swap entry using the cache flag, and allow only one thread to swap it in, also prevent any parallel code from putting the entry in the cache. Release the pin after PT unlocked. Racers just loop and wait since it's a rare and very short event. A schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1) call is added to avoid repeated page faults wasting too much CPU, causing livelock or adding too much noise to perf statistics. A similar livelock issue was described in commit 029c4628b2eb ("mm: swap: get rid of livelock in swapin readahead") Reproducer: This race issue can be triggered easily using a well constructed reproducer and patched brd (with a delay in read path) [1]: With latest 6.8 mainline, race caused data loss can be observed easily: $ gcc -g -lpthread test-thread-swap-race.c && ./a.out Polulating 32MB of memory region... Keep swapping out... Starting round 0... Spawning 65536 workers... 32746 workers spawned, wait for done... Round 0: Error on 0x5aa00, expected 32746, got 32743, 3 data loss! Round 0: Error on 0x395200, expected 32746, got 32743, 3 data loss! Round 0: Error on 0x3fd000, expected 32746, got 32737, 9 data loss! Round 0 Failed, 15 data loss! This reproducer spawns multiple threads sharing the same memory region using a small swap device. Every two threads updates mapped pages one by one in opposite direction trying to create a race, with one dedicated thread keep swapping out the data out using madvise. The reproducer created a reproduce rate of about once every 5 minutes, so the race should be totally possible in production. After this patch, I ran the reproducer for over a few hundred rounds and no data loss observed. Performance overhead is minimal, microbenchmark swapin 10G from 32G zram: Before: 10934698 us After: 11157121 us Cached: 13155355 us (Dropping SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO flag) [kasong@tencent.com: v4] | |||||
| CVE-2024-26748 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: cdns3: fix memory double free when handle zero packet 829 if (request->complete) { 830 spin_unlock(&priv_dev->lock); 831 usb_gadget_giveback_request(&priv_ep->endpoint, 832 request); 833 spin_lock(&priv_dev->lock); 834 } 835 836 if (request->buf == priv_dev->zlp_buf) 837 cdns3_gadget_ep_free_request(&priv_ep->endpoint, request); Driver append an additional zero packet request when queue a packet, which length mod max packet size is 0. When transfer complete, run to line 831, usb_gadget_giveback_request() will free this requestion. 836 condition is true, so cdns3_gadget_ep_free_request() free this request again. Log: [ 1920.140696][ T150] BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in cdns3_gadget_giveback+0x134/0x2c0 [cdns3] [ 1920.140696][ T150] [ 1920.151837][ T150] Use-after-free read at 0x000000003d1cd10b (in kfence-#36): [ 1920.159082][ T150] cdns3_gadget_giveback+0x134/0x2c0 [cdns3] [ 1920.164988][ T150] cdns3_transfer_completed+0x438/0x5f8 [cdns3] Add check at line 829, skip call usb_gadget_giveback_request() if it is additional zero length packet request. Needn't call usb_gadget_giveback_request() because it is allocated in this driver. | |||||
| CVE-2024-26739 | 2 Debian, Linux | 2 Debian Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_mirred: don't override retval if we already lost the skb If we're redirecting the skb, and haven't called tcf_mirred_forward(), yet, we need to tell the core to drop the skb by setting the retcode to SHOT. If we have called tcf_mirred_forward(), however, the skb is out of our hands and returning SHOT will lead to UaF. Move the retval override to the error path which actually need it. | |||||
| CVE-2024-26737 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix racing between bpf_timer_cancel_and_free and bpf_timer_cancel The following race is possible between bpf_timer_cancel_and_free and bpf_timer_cancel. It will lead a UAF on the timer->timer. bpf_timer_cancel(); spin_lock(); t = timer->time; spin_unlock(); bpf_timer_cancel_and_free(); spin_lock(); t = timer->timer; timer->timer = NULL; spin_unlock(); hrtimer_cancel(&t->timer); kfree(t); /* UAF on t */ hrtimer_cancel(&t->timer); In bpf_timer_cancel_and_free, this patch frees the timer->timer after a rcu grace period. This requires a rcu_head addition to the "struct bpf_hrtimer". Another kfree(t) happens in bpf_timer_init, this does not need a kfree_rcu because it is still under the spin_lock and timer->timer has not been visible by others yet. In bpf_timer_cancel, rcu_read_lock() is added because this helper can be used in a non rcu critical section context (e.g. from a sleepable bpf prog). Other timer->timer usages in helpers.c have been audited, bpf_timer_cancel() is the only place where timer->timer is used outside of the spin_lock. Another solution considered is to mark a t->flag in bpf_timer_cancel and clear it after hrtimer_cancel() is done. In bpf_timer_cancel_and_free, it busy waits for the flag to be cleared before kfree(t). This patch goes with a straight forward solution and frees timer->timer after a rcu grace period. | |||||
| CVE-2024-26736 | 2 Debian, Linux | 2 Debian Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 8.1 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Increase buffer size in afs_update_volume_status() The max length of volume->vid value is 20 characters. So increase idbuf[] size up to 24 to avoid overflow. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. [DH: Actually, it's 20 + NUL, so increase it to 24 and use snprintf()] | |||||
| CVE-2024-26734 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.0 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: devlink: fix possible use-after-free and memory leaks in devlink_init() The pernet operations structure for the subsystem must be registered before registering the generic netlink family. Make an unregister in case of unsuccessful registration. | |||||
| CVE-2024-26728 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: fix null-pointer dereference on edid reading Use i2c adapter when there isn't aux_mode in dc_link to fix a null-pointer derefence that happens when running igt@kms_force_connector_basic in a system with DCN2.1 and HDMI connector detected as below: [ +0.178146] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000004c0 [ +0.000010] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ +0.000005] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ +0.000004] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ +0.000006] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ +0.000006] CPU: 15 PID: 2368 Comm: kms_force_conne Not tainted 6.5.0-asdn+ #152 [ +0.000005] Hardware name: HP HP ENVY x360 Convertible 13-ay1xxx/8929, BIOS F.01 07/14/2021 [ +0.000004] RIP: 0010:i2c_transfer+0xd/0x100 [ +0.000011] Code: ea fc ff ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 <48> 8b 47 10 48 89 fb 48 83 38 00 0f 84 b3 00 00 00 83 3d 2f 80 16 [ +0.000004] RSP: 0018:ffff9c4f89c0fad0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ +0.000005] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000000080 [ +0.000003] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff9c4f89c0fb20 RDI: 00000000000004b0 [ +0.000003] RBP: ffff9c4f89c0fb80 R08: 0000000000000080 R09: ffff8d8e0b15b980 [ +0.000003] R10: 00000000000380e0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000080 [ +0.000002] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff9c4f89c0fb0e R15: ffff9c4f89c0fb0f [ +0.000004] FS: 00007f9ad2176c40(0000) GS:ffff8d90fe9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ +0.000003] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ +0.000004] CR2: 00000000000004c0 CR3: 0000000121bc4000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0 [ +0.000003] PKRU: 55555554 [ +0.000003] Call Trace: [ +0.000006] <TASK> [ +0.000006] ? __die+0x23/0x70 [ +0.000011] ? page_fault_oops+0x17d/0x4c0 [ +0.000008] ? preempt_count_add+0x6e/0xa0 [ +0.000008] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ +0.000011] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 [ +0.000009] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [ +0.000013] ? i2c_transfer+0xd/0x100 [ +0.000010] drm_do_probe_ddc_edid+0xc2/0x140 [drm] [ +0.000067] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ +0.000006] ? _drm_do_get_edid+0x97/0x3c0 [drm] [ +0.000043] ? __pfx_drm_do_probe_ddc_edid+0x10/0x10 [drm] [ +0.000042] edid_block_read+0x3b/0xd0 [drm] [ +0.000043] _drm_do_get_edid+0xb6/0x3c0 [drm] [ +0.000041] ? __pfx_drm_do_probe_ddc_edid+0x10/0x10 [drm] [ +0.000043] drm_edid_read_custom+0x37/0xd0 [drm] [ +0.000044] amdgpu_dm_connector_mode_valid+0x129/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000153] drm_connector_mode_valid+0x3b/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000000] __drm_helper_update_and_validate+0xfe/0x3c0 [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000000] ? amdgpu_dm_connector_get_modes+0xb6/0x520 [amdgpu] [ +0.000000] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ +0.000000] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x2ab/0x540 [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000000] status_store+0xb2/0x1f0 [drm] [ +0.000000] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x136/0x1d0 [ +0.000000] vfs_write+0x24d/0x440 [ +0.000000] ksys_write+0x6f/0xf0 [ +0.000000] do_syscall_64+0x60/0xc0 [ +0.000000] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ +0.000000] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40 [ +0.000000] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ +0.000000] ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xc0 [ +0.000000] ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xc0 [ +0.000000] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ +0.000000] RIP: 0033:0x7f9ad46b4b00 [ +0.000000] Code: 40 00 48 8b 15 19 b3 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 80 3d e1 3a 0e 00 00 74 17 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 58 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 [ +0.000000] RSP: 002b:00007ffcbd3bd6d8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ +0.000000] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9ad46b4b00 [ +0.000000] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f9ad48a7417 RDI: 0000000000000009 [ +0.000000] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08 ---truncated--- | |||||
| CVE-2024-26718 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-crypt, dm-verity: disable tasklets Tasklets have an inherent problem with memory corruption. The function tasklet_action_common calls tasklet_trylock, then it calls the tasklet callback and then it calls tasklet_unlock. If the tasklet callback frees the structure that contains the tasklet or if it calls some code that may free it, tasklet_unlock will write into free memory. The commits 8e14f610159d and d9a02e016aaf try to fix it for dm-crypt, but it is not a sufficient fix and the data corruption can still happen [1]. There is no fix for dm-verity and dm-verity will write into free memory with every tasklet-processed bio. There will be atomic workqueues implemented in the kernel 6.9 [2]. They will have better interface and they will not suffer from the memory corruption problem. But we need something that stops the memory corruption now and that can be backported to the stable kernels. So, I'm proposing this commit that disables tasklets in both dm-crypt and dm-verity. This commit doesn't remove the tasklet support, because the tasklet code will be reused when atomic workqueues will be implemented. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/d390d7ee-f142-44d3-822a-87949e14608b@suse.de/T/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240130091300.2968534-1-tj@kernel.org/ | |||||
| CVE-2024-26712 | 2 Debian, Linux | 2 Debian Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/kasan: Fix addr error caused by page alignment In kasan_init_region, when k_start is not page aligned, at the begin of for loop, k_cur = k_start & PAGE_MASK is less than k_start, and then `va = block + k_cur - k_start` is less than block, the addr va is invalid, because the memory address space from va to block is not alloced by memblock_alloc, which will not be reserved by memblock_reserve later, it will be used by other places. As a result, memory overwriting occurs. for example: int __init __weak kasan_init_region(void *start, size_t size) { [...] /* if say block(dcd97000) k_start(feef7400) k_end(feeff3fe) */ block = memblock_alloc(k_end - k_start, PAGE_SIZE); [...] for (k_cur = k_start & PAGE_MASK; k_cur < k_end; k_cur += PAGE_SIZE) { /* at the begin of for loop * block(dcd97000) va(dcd96c00) k_cur(feef7000) k_start(feef7400) * va(dcd96c00) is less than block(dcd97000), va is invalid */ void *va = block + k_cur - k_start; [...] } [...] } Therefore, page alignment is performed on k_start before memblock_alloc() to ensure the validity of the VA address. | |||||
| CVE-2024-26706 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: parisc: Fix random data corruption from exception handler The current exception handler implementation, which assists when accessing user space memory, may exhibit random data corruption if the compiler decides to use a different register than the specified register %r29 (defined in ASM_EXCEPTIONTABLE_REG) for the error code. If the compiler choose another register, the fault handler will nevertheless store -EFAULT into %r29 and thus trash whatever this register is used for. Looking at the assembly I found that this happens sometimes in emulate_ldd(). To solve the issue, the easiest solution would be if it somehow is possible to tell the fault handler which register is used to hold the error code. Using %0 or %1 in the inline assembly is not posssible as it will show up as e.g. %r29 (with the "%r" prefix), which the GNU assembler can not convert to an integer. This patch takes another, better and more flexible approach: We extend the __ex_table (which is out of the execution path) by one 32-word. In this word we tell the compiler to insert the assembler instruction "or %r0,%r0,%reg", where %reg references the register which the compiler choosed for the error return code. In case of an access failure, the fault handler finds the __ex_table entry and can examine the opcode. The used register is encoded in the lowest 5 bits, and the fault handler can then store -EFAULT into this register. Since we extend the __ex_table to 3 words we can't use the BUILDTIME_TABLE_SORT config option any longer. | |||||
| CVE-2024-26704 | 2 Debian, Linux | 2 Debian Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-08-04 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix double-free of blocks due to wrong extents moved_len In ext4_move_extents(), moved_len is only updated when all moves are successfully executed, and only discards orig_inode and donor_inode preallocations when moved_len is not zero. When the loop fails to exit after successfully moving some extents, moved_len is not updated and remains at 0, so it does not discard the preallocations. If the moved extents overlap with the preallocated extents, the overlapped extents are freed twice in ext4_mb_release_inode_pa() and ext4_process_freed_data() (as described in commit 94d7c16cbbbd ("ext4: Fix double-free of blocks with EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT")), and bb_free is incremented twice. Hence when trim is executed, a zero-division bug is triggered in mb_update_avg_fragment_size() because bb_free is not zero and bb_fragments is zero. Therefore, update move_len after each extent move to avoid the issue. | |||||