Total
395528 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-90115 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xsk: fix NULL pointer dereference in __xsk_rcv() In the __xsk_rcv() multi-buffer path, xsk_buff_alloc() is called in a loop without checking its return value. xsk_buff_can_alloc() only counts fill queue entries without validating their addresses, so it can succeed while xsk_buff_alloc() rejects all remaining entries and returns NULL. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: 0010:__xsk_rcv+0x426/0xc20 (net/xdp/xsk.c:350) Call Trace: xsk_generic_rcv+0x26d/0x5f0 xdp_do_generic_redirect+0x3c5/0xcf0 do_xdp_generic+0x92f/0xe70 __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0xf7e/0x2b30 Fix this with a two-stage transaction. First allocate and stage all buffers required for the packet, recycling all staged buffers with xsk_buff_free() if any allocation fails. Only after this stage succeeds, copy the data, reserve the RX descriptors, and release the buffers in an error-free loop. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90114 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: Reject descending VLAN tunnel ranges A pair of descending VLAN and tunnel IDs can pass the tunnel range span check. The VLAN subtraction produces a negative int, which is converted to unsigned when compared with the u32 tunnel ID subtraction. It can therefore equal the wrapped tunnel ID delta. The range loop then performs no iterations. Since the batched notification handling added a post-loop error check, this leaves err uninitialized and makes the request's return value unpredictable. Reject descending VLAN ranges before comparing the spans. Valid ascending and single-entry ranges remain unchanged, while malformed descending ranges consistently return -EINVAL. This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by manual source review. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90113 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netdevsim: update queue NAPI association on queue reset In netdevsim, receive queues (struct nsim_rq) embed their own struct napi_struct. When queue reset is performed (e.g. via queue_reset debugfs), nsim_queue_start() swaps in a newly allocated struct nsim_rq, and nsim_queue_mem_free() later deletes and frees the old one. However, nsim_queue_start() failed to update the queue-to-NAPI mapping via netif_queue_set_napi(). As a result, dev->_rx[idx].napi continued to point to the old NAPI struct. After the old queue was freed, a subsequent queue dump via Netlink (NETDEV_CMD_QUEUE_GET) triggered a KASAN slab-use-after-free read in nla_put_napi_id() when accessing rxq->napi->napi_id. Fix this by calling netif_queue_set_napi() in nsim_queue_start() to associate the new NAPI with the RX queue, and clear the association with netif_queue_set_napi(..., NULL) in nsim_del_napi() during teardown. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90112 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: qlcnic: validate unified ROM sections before loading The unified ROM parser reads directory, product, and data-descriptor fields from the firmware file. Existing validation forms table and data ends with unchecked additions and multiplications. Malformed values can wrap before they are compared with the firmware size. The parser also dereferences typed pointers at firmware-controlled offsets. Valid descriptor extents alone are insufficient for the consumers. The loader reads a fixed-size bootloader regardless of its declared size, the version parser assumes a 17-byte tail, and a partial final firmware word is read as a full u64. A truncated image can therefore make the driver read beyond the firmware allocation during validation or loading. Replace the pointer-returning parser with bounded range helpers. Validate table entry sizes, descriptor indices, section ranges, the fixed bootloader load length, and the version tail before exposing any section. Read all file fields with unaligned little-endian accessors and assemble a partial final word from only the bytes that remain. Apply the same range checks to the legacy image before reading its fixed fields. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90109 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sched: fix 32-bit backlog wrap in gred, bfifo and plug enqueue gred_enqueue(), bfifo_enqueue() and plug_enqueue() admit a packet when the current backlog plus the packet length fits within the queue limit: sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (gred default VQ) gred_backlog+qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= q->limit (gred configured VQ) sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (bfifo) sch->qstats.backlog + skb->len <= q->limit (plug) sch->qstats.backlog and q->backlog are u32, and qdisc_pkt_len()/skb->len are unsigned int, so all sums are computed in 32 bits and wrap at 2^32. Once the true backlog exceeds 4 GiB the wrapped sum becomes small and admission keeps succeeding, so the queue grows without bound and the kernel can be driven to OOM. Promote the sums to u64 so admission stops once the true backlog exceeds the limit. The limit is u32, so the bounded queue stays below 2^32 and the stored u32 backlog never wraps. The bug can only be reproduced as root (albeit with ridiculous setup): attach a gred (or bfifo/plug) qdisc with a limit near 4 GiB, leaving the default VQ unconfigured (for gred), and drive >4 GiB of queued traffic (e.g. via a size table / stab to inflate qdisc_pkt_len, or sustained high-rate traffic). The u32 backlog+len sum wraps at 2^32, admission keeps succeeding, and the queue grows unboundedly to OOM. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90108 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: free stashed qentry before overwrite in REQ_ADD_LINK to ADD_LINK transition When smc_llc_event_handler() transitions the local LLC flow from SMC_LLC_FLOW_REQ_ADD_LINK to SMC_LLC_FLOW_ADD_LINK on arrival of an ADD_LINK request, it calls smc_llc_flow_qentry_set() unconditionally: if (lgr->llc_flow_lcl.type == SMC_LLC_FLOW_REQ_ADD_LINK) { lgr->llc_flow_lcl.type = SMC_LLC_FLOW_ADD_LINK; smc_llc_flow_qentry_set(&lgr->llc_flow_lcl, qentry); ... } A CONFIRM_LINK or ADD_LINK_CONT arriving while flow->type is SMC_LLC_FLOW_REQ_ADD_LINK is stashed into flow->qentry via the SMC_LLC_CONFIRM_LINK / SMC_LLC_ADD_LINK_CONT handler (which stores into flow->qentry for any non-NONE flow type). When the subsequent ADD_LINK arrives, the REQ_ADD_LINK branch overwrites flow->qentry with the new pointer without first freeing the stashed allocation, leaking one kmalloc object. The stashed entry has no consumer: smc_llc_wait() is only called from llc_add_link_work, which is not yet scheduled while the flow type remains REQ_ADD_LINK. No waiter is sleeping on llc_msg_waiter at this point. It is safe to unconditionally free any stashed qentry before the overwrite. Call smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() before smc_llc_flow_qentry_set() in the REQ_ADD_LINK branch. smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() already checks flow->qentry before freeing, so the normal path where no entry is stashed is a no-op. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90107 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: free pending qentry in smc_llc_flow_stop() before memset smc_llc_flow_stop() resets a flow struct with a blind memset: spin_lock_bh(&lgr->llc_flow_lock); memset(flow, 0, sizeof(*flow)); flow->type = SMC_LLC_FLOW_NONE; spin_unlock_bh(&lgr->llc_flow_lock); If flow->qentry is non-NULL at this point the pointer is overwritten without the allocation being freed, leaking one kmalloc object. A late-arriving duplicate CONFIRM_LINK or ADD_LINK_CONT message can set flow->qentry after the legitimate message has been consumed by the waiter via smc_llc_flow_qentry_clr() (which NULLs the pointer but leaves flow->type non-zero) but before the flow completes and smc_llc_flow_stop() runs. In that window the duplicate is stashed into flow->qentry, and then lost when smc_llc_flow_stop() zeros the struct. Call smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() inside the lock before the memset. smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() already checks flow->qentry before freeing, so the normal case where no entry is pending is a no-op. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90106 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: arp/nd proxy: fix reading neigh ha Currently neigh ha address is read directly, but that can result in torn/partial reads if the neigh is being updated. Use neigh_ha_snapshot to take a stable snapshot of the address. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90105 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: fix reading neigh ha Currently arp/neigh_reduce read neigh ha directly which can lead to partial reads while the neigh is being updated. Use neigh_ha_snapshot to take a stable snapshot of the address similar to route_shortcircuit which already does the right thing. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90101 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bnxt_en: Fix call to hardware monitoring event handler The first parameter of hwmon_notify_event() is supposed to be the hardware monitoring device. The bnxt driver calls it with the platform device as first parameter instead. This API break results in undefined behavior and may result in a crash. Pass the hardware monitoring device as parameter instead to fix the problem. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90100 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ptp: netc: fix period truncation and potential divide-by-zero in PEROUT The max_period bound in net_timer_enable_perout() was computed as: max_period = (u64)NETC_TMR_DEFAULT_FIPER + integral_period; which exceeds U32_MAX when integral_period > 0 (e.g. 0x100000002 for the default 333333333 Hz clock). A period_ns that passes this check but exceeds U32_MAX is then silently truncated when stored into the u32 struct netc_pp::period field. A truncated value of zero can reach netc_timer_set_perout_alarm(), where the local u32 period variable would also be 0, causing a divide-by-zero in roundup_u64(delta, period) whenever the stime < min_time branch is taken (which always happens for a start time of {0, 0}). Additionally, netc_timer_enable_periodic_pulse() and netc_timer_enable_fiper() both compute: fiper = pp->period - integral_period; A zero pp->period results in an unsigned wraparound to 0xFFFFFFFD, mis-programming the FIPER hardware register. Fix all three issues by capping max_period at NETC_TMR_DEFAULT_FIPER (0xFFFFFFFF). This ensures that any period_ns passing the range check fits in a u32 without truncation, so the stored value is always valid and non-zero. The accepted range is reduced by integral_period ns (typically only a few nanoseconds), which is negligible in practice. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90099 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: account classifier filter allocations to memcg Allocations in the tc classifier *_change() paths (filter objects, per-CPU counters, and per-filter aux data) use plain GFP_KERNEL without __GFP_ACCOUNT, allowing unprivileged users to pin kernel memory outside memcg charging. The shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array allocation in cls_api.c was also uncharged; this patch closes it along with the per-classifier filter-object/percpu/aux allocations that remain unaccounted. Add GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT to: - the shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array (cls_api.c), common to every filter of every classifier (32 pointers, 256 bytes); - the filter-object, per-CPU-counter, and per-filter aux allocations in cls_basic, cls_bpf, cls_cgroup, cls_flow, cls_flower, cls_fw, cls_matchall, cls_route and cls_u32; - the u32_init_knode() replace-path knode allocation (cls_u32.c), which allocates the same struct tc_u_knode + sel.keys on every replace of an existing knode and was missed by the create-path-only conversion. Also fix the cls_basic error path: basic_change() inserts fnew into the IDR before allocating the per-CPU counter. If alloc_percpu() fails the errout path kfree'd fnew without idr_remove, leaving a dangling pointer in the IDR. With GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT the percpu alloc becomes failable on demand (memcg at memory.max), making the dead path attacker-reachable and burning the handle permanently. Add the idr_remove on the percpu failure path, matching the basic_set_parms failure-path pattern. Note: vega@nebusec.ai provided a poc for basic_cls, but it was easy to extend to the other classifiers. Conditions to recreate the bug: - CONFIG_NET_SCHED, CONFIG_NET_CLS_* (the classifier being used), CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT, CONFIG_MEMCG, CONFIG_USER_NS, CONFIG_NET_NS. - Unprivileged user in a fresh user+network namespace (unshare -Urn), or root with CAP_NET_ADMIN. - Create a large number of tc filters (e.g. tc filter add dev lo ingress ... <classifier> ...) while watching a memcg-limited cgroup: system slab grows far faster than memory.current, pinning kernel memory outside memcg charging. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90098 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sparx5: fix sleep in atomic context in MAC table access sparx5_set_rx_mode() runs with netif_addr_lock_bh held and iterates dev->mc via __dev_mc_sync(), which per address calls sparx5_mc_sync() / sparx5_mc_unsync() -> sparx5_mact_learn() / sparx5_mact_forget(). These take sparx5->lock, a mutex, and then poll the MAC access command register with readx_poll_timeout(). A mutex may block, which is not allowed from atomic context. Convert the driver to the new .ndo_set_rx_mode_async callback introduced in commit 3554b4345d85 ("net: introduce ndo_set_rx_mode_async and netdev_rx_mode_work"). The async callback is invoked from process context, so the mutex and sleeping completion poll can remain. Observed with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK, CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES and CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP enabled: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:591 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 217, name: ip preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 Call trace: __might_resched+0x144/0x248 __might_sleep+0x48/0x7c __mutex_lock+0x74/0x850 mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 sparx5_mact_learn+0x78/0x100 sparx5_mc_sync+0x40/0x54 __hw_addr_sync_dev+0xc4/0x170 sparx5_set_rx_mode+0x4c/0x58 __dev_set_rx_mode+0x64/0xa4 __dev_open+0x1ec/0x26c | |||||
| CVE-2026-90097 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Drivers: hv: vmbus: Skip VMBus module cleanup for non-nested root partition The VMBus module initialization function, hv_acpi_init(), currently does nothing when running in the root partition and root is not nested in another VM. But the initialization function reports success, so the VMBus module is indeed loaded. VMBus functionality is not actually needed, but the VMBus module must be loaded so that hv_vmbus_exists() can answer correctly. Furthermore, the mshv_root dependency on the VMBus module is needed as described in the commit message for 840b740a35bf ("mshv: Add conditional VMBus dependency"). Loading the VMBus module without actually initializing it causes failures if the module should later be unloaded. The module unload code tries to clean up things that were never initialized, resulting in memory faults and a panic. Fix this by having VMBus module exit function perform the same check for non-nested root partition, and do nothing in such a case, just like hv_acpi_init(). In the long run, the code that manages the Hyper-V provided SynIC should be refactored to better coordinate the requirements of root partition scenarios and normal VM scenarios, and to hopefully remove the hv_vmbus_exists() dependnecy between mshv_root and VMBus modules. Preventing the current unload failure scenario is an expediency until such a refactoring is done. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90096 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: invalidate the correct range after O_APPEND direct write fuse_direct_write_iter() captures pos before generic_write_checks(), which moves ki_pos to EOF for O_APPEND writes: fuse_direct_write_iter() { pos = iocb->ki_pos; /* 0 (user-supplied) */ generic_write_checks(); /* ki_pos -> EOF */ fuse_direct_io(); /* writes at EOF, correct */ invalidate(pos, pos + res); /* [0, res) -- wrong */ } The post-write invalidation targets a stale range instead of the actual written range at EOF. This can cause data inconsistency when the file size is not page-aligned. The tail page straddling EOF has a valid portion before EOF that concurrent readers can fault back in during the DIO write window: Tail page (file size X not page-aligned): page_start X (EOF) page_end |--- valid data ----|-- stale --| CPU0 (O_APPEND DIO writer) CPU1 (buffered reader) -------------------------- ---------------------- invalidate [X, X+len) tail page evicted FUSE_WRITE in flight ... read [page_start, X) tail page re-faulted [X, page_end) = stale FUSE_WRITE completes i_size = X + len invalidate [0, len) <- WRONG tail page still cached read [X, X+len) hits stale tail page returns old data Fix by reading pos back from iocb->ki_pos after generic_write_checks(), as generic_file_direct_write() does. Also fix a typo in the comment ("may have" -> "may have competed"). | |||||
| CVE-2026-90095 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: Fix the condition to enable over-io-uring The existing condition in fuse_uring_cmd() is there only to avoid disabling io-uring for connections that already run with it, missing was a condition to refuse any IORING_OP_URING_CMD if the connection/channel didn't get enabled because of missing FUSE_INIT reply flag FUSE_OVER_IO_URING. Without the reply flag the barrier in fuse_uring_ready() doesn't work and IO could already be going on and cause deadlock states (at a minimum one between fch->bg_lock and queue->lock). The change itself is trivial, but brings behavior change, FUSE_OVER_IO_URING has to be set in the FUSE_INIT_REPLY by fuse servers to accept any IORING_OP_URING_CMD. Libfuse does that and the only non-libfuse implementation I found (fractal-fuse) also does it. Qemu patches for fuse-io-uring are not merged yet, as far as I know. Moved up is the smp_load_acquire(&fch->initialized) check, as a fuse-server implementation might try to setup io-uring before FUSE_INIT is processed and might have gotten -EOPNOTSUPP instead of -EAGAIN. Also fixed is a stale comment that explains the handling of the FUSE_OVER_IO_URING flag in early RFC versions. If there should be a report from any library or application we probably need to revert this commit. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90094 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: process: Fix context switching MTE store-only tag check SCTLR_EL1.TCSO0 is set when user opt-in for MTE store-only tag check mode. However, it is not part of SCTLR_USER_MASK which imply that on context switch we never clear SCTLR_EL1.TCSO0, so we are leaking that setting into another task. Fix that by including SCTLR_EL1_TCSO0_MASK into SCTLR_USER_MASK | |||||
| CVE-2026-90090 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtksdio: Fix out-of-bounds DMA read in the TX path btmtksdio_tx_packet() rounds the transfer size up to the SDIO block size of 256 bytes, but hands the host controller the SKB buffer as is: err = sdio_writesb(bdev->func, MTK_REG_CTDR, skb->data, round_up(skb->len, MTK_SDIO_BLOCK_SIZE)); Only skb->len bytes hold packet data, so the controller reads up to 255 bytes of uninitialised memory and sends it to the device over the SDIO bus. Depending on how much tailroom slack the SKB allocation happens to carry, that read can also extend past the end of the buffer. Compute the padded length up front, ensure the SKB has tailroom for it, and zero-fill the padding with skb_put_zero(). skb->len then covers the padding, so sdio_writesb() no longer needs to round up. byte_tx keeps counting the header and the payload only, and the error path restores the SKB so that the caller can requeue it. Writing behind skb->tail is only safe because the driver owns the buffer, which "Bluetooth: btmtksdio: Take exclusive ownership of the SKB before TX" ensures. | |||||
| CVE-2026-90088 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Validate MTU in rfcomm_apply_pn() to prevent infinite loop rfcomm_apply_pn() accepts the MTU value from a remote PN (Parameter Negotiation) frame without checking for zero. When the remote peer sends an MTU of zero, d->mtu is set to 0. This causes the sendmsg path to enter an infinite loop when fragmenting data, as each fragment has size == min_t(size_t, len, 0) == 0, so the remaining length never decreases. The infinite allocation of zero-length skbs exhausts all system memory. Fix by clamping d->mtu to RFCOMM_DEFAULT_MTU when the negotiated value is zero, consistent with the initial value assigned in rfcomm_dlc_alloc(). | |||||
| CVE-2026-90087 | 2026-09-17 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: do not leak an hci_conn when a second LE connect is rejected create_le_conn_complete() decides whether the failed connection is still pending by comparing it against hci_lookup_le_connect(), which returns the first LE connection in BT_CONNECT. That is the same connection only while at most one is pending. Two can be pending. Connections created on the passive scan path sit in BT_CONNECT with HCI_CONN_SCANNING set and are invisible to hci_lookup_le_connect() until hci_le_create_conn_sync() clears the flag when their command is issued, so the -EBUSY guard in hci_connect_le() does not prevent a second connection from being queued while the first is still on the scan path. Whenever two connections are in BT_CONNECT at once, the lookup may return one connection while create_le_conn_complete() is reporting the failure of the other; the early exit then drops the error and hci_conn_failed() never runs on the connection that failed. The controller also rejects a second HCI_OP_LE_CREATE_CONN issued while another connection creation is still outstanding, per Core Spec Vol 4, Part E. The spec calls for Command Disallowed there; the bcm43438 observed here answers with an LMP/LL error code instead, which bt_to_errno() maps to the -EPROTO (-71) in the log below. The leaked connection stays in BT_CONNECT forever, and because hci_connect_le() refuses to dial while hci_lookup_le_connect() finds anything, every subsequent attempt to reach any peer fails with -EBUSY and no command reaches the controller at all. Seen on a bcm43438 with two BLE peers polled on the same interval (state 5 is BT_CONNECT; both handles are UNSET ones, allocated from the ida above HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX): Bluetooth: hci1: Opcode 0x2013 failed: -71 # hcitool con < LE 14:9C:EF:03:68:81 handle 3840 state 5 lm CENTRAL < LE C4:D3:6A:8C:B5:38 handle 3841 state 5 lm CENTRAL A btmon capture across the next ten minutes of connect attempts contains no HCI_OP_LE_CREATE_CONN at all; outgoing LE connections do not recover until the adapter is reset. With this change the same scenario fails the rejected connection cleanly and further connects to both peers go through. Ask about the connection itself instead of about the device. | |||||