Total
398385 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-80686 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: migrate_device: fix pte_pfn/pte_dirty called on non-present PTE pte_pfn() and pte_dirty() have undefined behaviour when called on a non-present PTE. In migrate_vma_collect_pmd(), these functions may be invoked on non-present entries (e.g., device-private entries), leading to potential crashes from pte_pfn() or incorrect dirty folio accounting from pte_dirty(). Fix both by guarding with pte_present() checks. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80679 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/dasd: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference dasd_release_space() checks the implementation of the is_ese() discipline function before calling it to determine if a given device is an ESE DASD. The current usage of the logical AND operator will lead to a NULL pointer dereference as the function is called even if the function pointer is NULL. Fix this by using the logical OR operator. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80676 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Drivers: hv: vmbus: use generic driver_override infrastructure When a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus' match() callback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the driver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF. Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking care of proper locking internally. Note that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock held is intentional. [1] | |||||
| CVE-2026-80669 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Disable xfrm_decode_session hook attachment BPF LSM programs can currently attach to xfrm_decode_session(). That hook may return an error, but security_skb_classify_flow() calls it from a void path and triggers BUG_ON() if an error is returned. Disable BPF attachment to the hook to prevent a BPF LSM program from turning packet classification into a full panic. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80667 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: LAG, MPESW, Fix missing complete() on devcom error mlx5_mpesw_work() returned without calling complete() when mlx5_lag_get_devcom_comp() returned NULL. A caller that queued the work and waited on mpesww->comp would block indefinitely. Funnel the early-return path through a new "complete" label so the waiter is always woken. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80666 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: sco: Fix a race condition in sco_sock_timeout() sco_sock_timeout() runs asynchronously and lock_sock(sk). If the socket is closing while the timer is running, it holds the same lock (lock_sock(sk)) twice, leading to a deadlock. CPU 0 CPU 1 ==================== ====================== sco_sock_close() sco_sock_timeout() lock_sock(sk) // <-- LOCK __sco_sock_close() sco_chan_del() sco_conn_put() sco_conn_free() disable_delayed_work_sync() lock(sk) // <-- SAME LOCK Fix this by moving disable_delayed_work_sync() outside of lock_sock(sk), ensuring that no lock_sock(sk) is held before sco_sock_timeout(). Lockdep splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.13.0-rc4 #7 Not tainted syz-executor292/9514 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8881115d5070 ((work_completion)(&(&conn->timeout_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: rcu_lock_acquire sect/v6.13-rc4/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:337 [inline] ffff8881115d5070 ((work_completion)(&(&conn->timeout_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: rcu_read_lock sect/v6.13-rc4/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:849 [inline] ffff8881115d5070 ((work_completion)(&(&conn->timeout_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: start_flush_work sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:4137 [inline] ffff8881115d5070 ((work_completion)(&(&conn->timeout_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xd1/0xc40 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:4195 but task is already holding lock: ffff88807db3a258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock sect/v6.13-rc4/./include/net/sock.h:1623 [inline] ffff88807db3a258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sco_sock_close+0x25/0x100 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/bluetooth/sco.c:524 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0x1c4/0x520 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x130 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/core/sock.c:3622 lock_sock sect/v6.13-rc4/./include/net/sock.h:1623 [inline] sco_sock_timeout+0xbe/0x270 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/bluetooth/sco.c:158 process_one_work sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa99/0x18f0 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0x8a9/0xd80 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x2c6/0x360 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4e/0x80 sect/v6.13-rc4/arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 sect/v6.13-rc4/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&conn->timeout_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: check_prev_add sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x1888/0x5760 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x13b4/0x2120 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226 lock_acquire+0x1c4/0x520 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 touch_work_lockdep_map sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:3909 [inline] start_flush_work sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:4163 [inline] __flush_work+0x70f/0xc40 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:4195 __cancel_work_sync sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:4351 [inline] disable_delayed_work_sync+0xbb/0xf0 sect/v6.13-rc4/kernel/workqueue.c:4514 sco_conn_free sect/v6.13-rc4/net/bluetooth/sco.c:95 [inline] kref_put sect/v6.13-rc4/./include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] sco_conn_put+0x18f/0x270 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/bluetooth/sco.c:107 sco_chan_del+0xe2/0x210 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/bluetooth/sco.c:236 sco_sock_close+0x8f/0x100 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/bluetooth/sco.c:526 sco_sock_release+0x62/0x2d0 sect/v6.13-rc4/net/blueto ---truncated--- | |||||
| CVE-2026-80660 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (occ) unregister sysfs devices outside occ lock occ_active(false) and occ_shutdown() unregister sysfs-backed devices while occ->lock is held. hwmon_device_unregister() and sysfs_remove_group() can wait for active sysfs callbacks to drain, and those callbacks can enter the OCC update path and try to take occ->lock again. That gives the unregister paths the lock ordering occ->lock -> sysfs callback drain, while a callback has the opposite edge sysfs callback -> occ->lock. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the real unregister and callback carrier: occ_shutdown() hwmon_device_unregister() occ_show_temp_1() occ_update_response() Lockdep reported the circular dependency with occ_shutdown() already holding the OCC mutex and hwmon_device_unregister() waiting on the sysfs side: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected ... (sysfs_lock) ... at: hwmon_device_unregister+0x12/0x30 [vuln_msv] ... (&test_occ.lock) ... at: occ_shutdown.constprop.0+0xe/0x40 [vuln_msv] occ_update_response.isra.0+0xb/0x20 [vuln_msv] occ_show_temp_1.constprop.0.isra.0+0x23/0x40 [vuln_msv] *** DEADLOCK *** Serialize hwmon registration and removal with a separate hwmon_lock. Under that lock, detach occ->hwmon and update occ->active while occ->lock is held so concurrent OCC state changes still see a stable state, then drop occ->lock before calling hwmon_device_unregister(). Remove the driver sysfs group before taking occ->lock in occ_shutdown(), so draining the driver attributes cannot wait while the OCC mutex is held. Also make OCC update callbacks return -ENODEV after deactivation, so callbacks that already passed sysfs active protection do not poll the hardware after teardown has detached the hwmon device. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80659 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: vub300: defer reset until cmd_mutex is unlocked vub300_cmndwork_thread() holds cmd_mutex while it sends a command and waits for the command response. If the response wait times out, __vub300_command_response() kills the command URBs and then synchronously resets the USB device through usb_reset_device(). That reset path re-enters the driver through vub300_pre_reset(), which also takes cmd_mutex. The worker therefore tries to acquire the same mutex recursively while it is still holding it from the command path. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the real worker and timeout/reset carrier: vub300_cmndwork_thread() __vub300_command_response() usb_lock_device_for_reset() usb_reset_device() vub300_pre_reset() Lockdep reported the same-task recursive acquisition on cmd_mutex: WARNING: possible recursive locking detected ... (&test_vub300.cmd_mutex) ... at: usb_reset_device... [vuln_msv] ... (&test_vub300.cmd_mutex) ... at: vub300_cmndwork_thread+0x12/0x20 [vuln_msv] Workqueue: vub300_cmd_wq vub300_cmndwork_thread [vuln_msv] *** DEADLOCK *** Return a flag from __vub300_command_response() when the timeout path needs a device reset, then perform the reset after vub300_cmndwork_thread() has cleared the in-flight command state and dropped cmd_mutex. The reset is still attempted before mmc_request_done(), preserving the existing request completion ordering while avoiding the recursive lock. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80658 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/rockchip: dw_dp: Fix null-ptr-deref in dw_dp_remove() Attempting to access driver data in the platform driver ->remove() callback may lead to a null pointer dereference since there is no guaranty that the component ->bind() callback invoking platform_set_drvdata() was executed. A common scenario is when Rockchip DRM driver didn't manage to run component_bind_all() because of an (unrelated) error causing early return from rockchip_drm_bind(). Drop the unnecessary call to platform_get_drvdata() and, instead, reference the target device structure via platform_device. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80657 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: Guard management mailbox channel cleanup against NULL pointer The management mailbox channel cleanup helpers can be called from error handling paths when mgmt_chann has already been destroyed. Add NULL checks to xdna_mailbox_free_channel() and xdna_mailbox_stop_channel() so the cleanup path safely returns instead of dereferencing a NULL mailbox channel pointer. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80655 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: soc: xilinx: Fix race condition in event registration The zynqmp_power driver registers handlers for suspend and subsystem restart events using register_event(). However, the work structures (zynqmp_pm_init_suspend_work and zynqmp_pm_init_restart_work) used by these handlers were allocated and initialized after the registration call. This created a race window where, if the firmware triggered an event immediately after registration but before allocation, the callback (suspend_event_callback or subsystem_restart_event_callback) would dereference a NULL pointer in work_pending(), leading to a crash. Fix this by allocating and initializing the work structures before registering the events. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80654 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: soc: xilinx: Shutdown and free rx mailbox channel A mbox rx channel is requested using mbox_request_channel_byname() in probe. In remove callback, the rx mailbox channel is cleaned up when the rx_chan is NULL due to incorrect condition check. The mailbox channel is not shutdown and it can receive messages even after the device removal. This leads to use after free. Also the channel resources are not freed. Fix this by checking the rx_chan correctly. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80652 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ccp - Treat zero-length cert chain as query for blob lengths When handling a PDH export, treat a zero-length userspace cert chain buffer as a request to query the length of the relevant blobs. Failure to account for the zero-length buffer trips a BUG_ON() when running with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y due to trying to get the physical address of the ZERO_SIZE_PTR (returned by kzalloc() on the bogus allocation). kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:28 ! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 28580 Comm: syz.2.18 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.18.16-smp-DEV #1 NONE Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025 RIP: 0010:__phys_addr+0x16a/0x180 arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:28 RSP: 0018:ffffc9008329fc80 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff8179110a RBX: 0000778000000010 RCX: ffff8884e6992600 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000010 RDI: 0000778000000010 RBP: ffffc9008329fdf0 R08: 0000000000000dc0 R09: 00000000ffffffff R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff126d297 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: 1ffff92010653fc8 R14: 0000000080000010 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 0000555556bec9c0(0000) GS:ffff88aa4ce1c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fd3159e7000 CR3: 00000004fbc44000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> [<ffffffff853d3869>] sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export+0x559/0x7a0 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2308 [<ffffffff853d1fdd>] sev_ioctl+0x2cd/0x480 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2556 [<ffffffff82549ebc>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:52 [inline] [<ffffffff82549ebc>] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:598 [inline] [<ffffffff82549ebc>] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:584 [<ffffffff8630115f>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:64 [inline] [<ffffffff8630115f>] do_syscall_64+0x9f/0xf40 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:98 [<ffffffff81000136>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fd3158eac39 </TASK> Thankfully, the bug is benign outside of CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y as getting the physical address is just arithmetic, and the PSP errors out before trying to write to the garbage address (which it must, otherwise querying the blob lengths would clobber memory at pfn=0). | |||||
| CVE-2026-80651 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ccp/sev-dev-tsm - bail out early when pdev->bus is NULL dsm_create() initially checks pdev->bus when computing segment_id: u8 segment_id = pdev->bus ? pci_domain_nr(pdev->bus) : 0; But the next two lines unconditionally dereference pdev->bus via pcie_find_root_port() and especially pci_dev_id(pdev), which expands to PCI_DEVID(dev->bus->number, dev->devfn). If pdev->bus is in fact NULL, segment_id is initialised to 0 but the very next statement crashes the kernel. smatch flags this: drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tsm.c:253 dsm_create() error: we previously assumed 'pdev->bus' could be null (see line 251) Make the NULL handling consistent: if pdev->bus is NULL the device has no PCI context to work with and SEV TIO setup cannot proceed, so return -ENODEV before any of the bus-dependent lookups. The remaining initialisation now runs only on the path where pdev->bus is known to be valid. No change for callers where pdev->bus is non-NULL, which is the only case where dsm_create() did meaningful work before this change. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80650 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: atomisp: gc2235: fix UAF and memory leak gc2235_probe() handles its error paths incorrectly. If media_entity_pads_init() fails, gc2235_remove() is called, which tears down the subdev and frees dev, but then still falls through to atomisp_register_i2c_module(). This results in use-after-free. If atomisp_register_i2c_module() fails, the media entity and control handler are left initialized and dev is leaked. gc2235_remove() unconditionally calls media_entity_cleanup() and v4l2_ctrl_handler_free(), but these are not initialized at every error path in gc2235_probe(). Replace gc2235_remove() calls in the probe error paths with explicit unwind labels that free only the resources initialized at each point of failure, in reverse order of initialization. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80648 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pinctrl: spacemit: fix NULL check in spacemit_pin_set_config spacemit_pin_set_config() looks up the per-pin descriptor with spacemit_get_pin() then checks the wrong variable for failure: const struct spacemit_pin *spin = spacemit_get_pin(pctrl, pin); ... if (!pin) return -EINVAL; reg = spacemit_pin_to_reg(pctrl, spin->pin); pin is an unsigned int pin id, where 0 (GPIO_0 / gmac0_rxdv on K3) is a valid pin, so rejecting it here drops the PAD config write for the first pin of every group. On K3 Pico-ITX the GMAC RGMII group lists pin 0 as its first entry, so its drive-strength / bias configuration was silently ignored. The intended guard is against spacemit_get_pin() returning NULL when the pin id isn't in the SoC's pin table. Check spin instead, which both restores PAD setup for pin 0 and prevents a NULL deref on spin->pin. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80647 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/hns: Fix warning in poll cq direct mode CQs allocated by ib_alloc_cq() always have a comp_handler. Though in direct mode this handler is never expected to be called, it is still called when the driver is reset, triggering the following WARN_ONCE(): Call trace: ib_cq_completion_direct+0x38/0x60 hns_roce_cq_completion+0x54/0x90 (hns_roce_hw_v2] hns_roce_handle_device_err+Ox1c8/0x340 [hns_roce_hw_v2] hns_roce_hw_v2_uninit_instance.constprop.0+0x34/0x70 [hns_roce_hw_v2] hns_roce_hw_v2_reset_notify+0xc4/0xe0 [hns_roce_hw_v2] hclge_notify_roce_client+0x60/0xbc [hclge] hclge_reset_rebuild+0x48/0x34c [hclge] hclge_reset_subtask+0xcc/0xec [hclge] hclge_reset_service_task+0x80/0x160 [hclge] hclge_service_task+0x50/0x80 (hclge] process_one_work+0x1cc/0x4d0 worker_thread+0x154/0x414 kthread+0x104/0x144 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 | |||||
| CVE-2026-80644 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: don't BUG_ON an invalid journal dinode [BUG] A fuzzed OCFS2 image can corrupt the current slot journal dinode while mount is still in progress. The mount path first reports the invalid journal block and then crashes in shutdown: kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1034! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:ocfs2_journal_toggle_dirty+0x2d6/0x340 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1034 Call Trace: ocfs2_journal_shutdown+0x414/0xc30 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1116 ocfs2_mount_volume fs/ocfs2/super.c:1785 [inline] ocfs2_fill_super+0x30a9/0x3cd0 fs/ocfs2/super.c:1083 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x38b/0x640 fs/super.c:1698 get_tree_bdev+0x24/0x40 fs/super.c:1721 ocfs2_get_tree+0x21/0x30 fs/ocfs2/super.c:1184 vfs_get_tree+0x9a/0x370 fs/super.c:1758 fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1199 [inline] do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3642 [inline] do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3718 [inline] path_mount+0x5b8/0x1ea0 fs/namespace.c:4028 do_mount fs/namespace.c:4041 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4229 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4206 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x320 fs/namespace.c:4206 ... [CAUSE] ocfs2_journal_toggle_dirty() used to return -EIO when journal->j_bh no longer contained a valid dinode, because the startup and shutdown paths already handled that failure. Commit 10995aa2451a ("ocfs2: Morph the haphazard OCFS2_IS_VALID_DINODE() checks.") changed the check to a BUG_ON() under the assumption that the journal dinode had already been validated. That turns an unexpected invalid journal dinode during mount teardown into a kernel crash instead of a normal mount failure. [FIX] Replace the BUG_ON() with WARN_ON() and return -EIO. This keeps the invariant warning for debugging, but restores the original behavior of failing startup or shutdown cleanly instead of panicking the kernel. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80643 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: EDAC/igen6: Fix call trace due to missing release() When unloading the igen6_edac driver, there is a call trace: Device '(null)' does not have a release() function, it is broken and must be fixed. See Documentation/core-api/kobject.rst. WARNING: drivers/base/core.c:2567 at device_release+0x84/0x90, CPU#5: rmmod/127209 ... RIP: 0010:device_release+0x84/0x90 Call Trace: <TASK> kobject_put+0x8c/0x220 put_device+0x17/0x30 igen6_unregister_mcis+0xa2/0xe0 [igen6_edac] igen6_remove+0x82/0xb0 [igen6_edac] ... Fix the call trace by providing empty release() functions for the memory controller devices. | |||||
| CVE-2026-80642 | 2026-08-28 | N/A | N/A | ||
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: liveupdate: Reference count incoming FLB data Increment the incoming FLB refcount in liveupdate_flb_get_incoming() so that the FLB structure cannot be freed while the caller is actively using it. Add an additional liveupdate_flb_put_incoming() function so the caller can explicitly indicate when it is done using the FLB data. During a Live Update, a subsystem might need to hold onto the incoming File-Lifecycle-Bound (FLB) data for an extended period, such as during device enumeration. Incrementing the reference count guarantees that the data remains valid and accessible until the subsystem releases it, preventing future use-after-free bugs. | |||||