Total
9747 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-32188 | 1 Microsoft | 5 365 Apps, Excel, Office and 2 more | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.1 HIGH |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. | |||||
| CVE-2026-32076 | 1 Microsoft | 6 Windows 11 23h2, Windows 11 24h2, Windows 11 25h2 and 3 more | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Storage Spaces Controller allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31967 | 1 Htslib | 1 Htslib | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 9.1 CRITICAL |
| HTSlib is a library for reading and writing bioinformatics file formats. CRAM is a compressed format which stores DNA sequence alignment data. In the `cram_decode_slice()` function called while reading CRAM records, the value of the mate reference id field was not validated. Later use of this value, for example when converting the data to SAM format, could result in the out of bounds array reads when looking up the corresponding reference name. If the array value obtained also happened to be a valid pointer, it would be interpreted as a string and an attempt would be made to write the data as part of the SAM record. This bug may allow information about program state to be leaked. It may also cause a program crash through an attempt to access invalid memory. Versions 1.23.1, 1.22.2 and 1.21.1 include fixes for this issue. There is no workaround for this issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31966 | 1 Htslib | 1 Htslib | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 9.1 CRITICAL |
| HTSlib is a library for reading and writing bioinformatics file formats. CRAM is a compressed format which stores DNA sequence alignment data. As one method of removing redundant data, CRAM uses reference-based compression so that instead of storing the full sequence for each alignment record it stores a location in an external reference sequence along with a list of differences to the reference at that location as a sequence of "features". When decoding CRAM records, the reference data is stored in a char array, and parts matching the alignment record sequence are copied over as necessary. Due to insufficient validation of the feature data series, it was possible to make the `cram_decode_seq()` function copy data from either before the start, or after the end of the stored reference either into the buffer used to store the output sequence for the cram record, or into the buffer used to build the SAM `MD` tag. This allowed arbitrary data to be leaked to the calling function. This bug may allow information about program state to be leaked. It may also cause a program crash through an attempt to access invalid memory. Versions 1.23.1, 1.22.2 and 1.21.1 include fixes for this issue. There is no workaround for this issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31965 | 1 Htslib | 1 Htslib | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 8.2 HIGH |
| HTSlib is a library for reading and writing bioinformatics file formats. CRAM is a compressed format which stores DNA sequence alignment data. In the `cram_decode_slice()` function called while reading CRAM records, validation of the reference id field occurred too late, allowing two out of bounds reads to occur before the invalid data was detected. The bug does allow two values to be leaked to the caller, however as the function reports an error it may be difficult to exploit them. It is also possible that the program will crash due to trying to access invalid memory. Versions 1.23.1, 1.22.2 and 1.21.1 include fixes for this issue. There is no workaround for this issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31962 | 1 Htslib | 1 Htslib | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| HTSlib is a library for reading and writing bioinformatics file formats. CRAM is a compressed format which stores DNA sequence alignment data. While most alignment records store DNA sequence and quality values, the format also allows them to omit this data in certain cases to save space. Due to some quirks of the CRAM format, it is necessary to handle these records carefully as they will actually store data that needs to be consumed and then discarded. Unfortunately the `cram_decode_seq()` did not handle this correctly in some cases. Where this happened it could result in reading a single byte from beyond the end of a heap allocation, followed by writing a single attacker-controlled byte to the same location. Exploiting this bug causes a heap buffer overflow. If a user opens a file crafted to exploit this issue, it could lead to the program crashing, or overwriting of data and heap structures in ways not expected by the program. It may be possible to use this to obtain arbitrary code execution. Versions 1.23.1, 1.22.2 and 1.21.1 include fixes for this issue. There is no workaround for this issue. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31897 | 1 Freerdp | 1 Freerdp | 2026-06-17 | N/A | N/A |
| FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to 3.24.0, there is an out-of-bounds read in freerdp_bitmap_decompress_planar when SrcSize is 0. The function dereferences *srcp (which points to pSrcData) without first verifying that SrcSize >= 1. When SrcSize is 0 and pSrcData is non-NULL, this reads one byte past the end of the source buffer. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.24.0. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31885 | 1 Freerdp | 1 Freerdp | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 6.5 MEDIUM |
| FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to 3.24.0, there is an out-of-bounds read in MS-ADPCM and IMA-ADPCM decoders due to unchecked predictor and step_index values from input data. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.24.0. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31797 | 1 Color | 1 Iccdev | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 6.1 MEDIUM |
| iccDEV provides a set of libraries and tools for working with ICC color management profiles. Prior to 2.3.1.5, there is a heap out-of-bounds read in CTiffImg::ReadLine() when iccApplyProfiles processes a crafted TIFF image, causing memory disclosure or crash. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.3.1.5. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31794 | 1 Color | 1 Iccdev | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| iccDEV provides a set of libraries and tools for working with ICC color management profiles. Prior to 2.3.1.5, there is a segmentation fault from invalid/wild pointer read in CIccCLUT::Interp3d() causing a denial of service. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.3.1.5. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31793 | 1 Color | 1 Iccdev | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 5.5 MEDIUM |
| iccDEV provides a set of libraries and tools for working with ICC color management profiles. Prior to 2.3.1.5, there is a segmentation fault due to invalid/wild pointer read in CIccCalculatorFunc::ApplySequence() causing denial of service. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.3.1.5. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31782 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86: Fix potential bad container_of in intel_pmu_hw_config Auto counter reload may have a group of events with software events present within it. The software event PMU isn't the x86_hybrid_pmu and a container_of operation in intel_pmu_set_acr_caused_constr (via the hybrid helper) could cause out of bound memory reads. Avoid this by guarding the call to intel_pmu_set_acr_caused_constr with an is_x86_event check. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31779 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 8.1 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix potential out-of-bounds read in iwl_mvm_nd_match_info_handler() The memcpy function assumes the dynamic array notif->matches is at least as large as the number of bytes to copy. Otherwise, results->matches may contain unwanted data. To guarantee safety, extend the validation in one of the checks to ensure sufficient packet length. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31778 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.1 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: caiaq: fix stack out-of-bounds read in init_card The loop creates a whitespace-stripped copy of the card shortname where `len < sizeof(card->id)` is used for the bounds check. Since sizeof(card->id) is 16 and the local id buffer is also 16 bytes, writing 16 non-space characters fills the entire buffer, overwriting the terminating nullbyte. When this non-null-terminated string is later passed to snd_card_set_id() -> copy_valid_id_string(), the function scans forward with `while (*nid && ...)` and reads past the end of the stack buffer, reading the contents of the stack. A USB device with a product name containing many non-ASCII, non-space characters (e.g. multibyte UTF-8) will reliably trigger this as follows: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in copy_valid_id_string sound/core/init.c:696 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in snd_card_set_id_no_lock+0x698/0x74c sound/core/init.c:718 The off-by-one has been present since commit bafeee5b1f8d ("ALSA: snd_usb_caiaq: give better shortname") from June 2009 (v2.6.31-rc1), which first introduced this whitespace-stripping loop. The original code never accounted for the null terminator when bounding the copy. Fix this by changing the loop bound to `sizeof(card->id) - 1`, ensuring at least one byte remains as the null terminator. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31774 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.1 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/net: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in io_bundle_nbufs() sqe->len is __u32 but gets stored into sr->len which is int. When userspace passes sqe->len values exceeding INT_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF), sr->len overflows to a negative value. This negative value propagates through the bundle recv/send path: 1. io_recv(): sel.val = sr->len (ssize_t gets -1) 2. io_recv_buf_select(): arg.max_len = sel->val (size_t gets 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) 3. io_ring_buffers_peek(): buf->len is not clamped because max_len is astronomically large 4. iov[].iov_len = 0xFFFFFFFF flows into io_bundle_nbufs() 5. io_bundle_nbufs(): min_t(int, 0xFFFFFFFF, ret) yields -1, causing ret to increase instead of decrease, creating an infinite loop that reads past the allocated iov[] array This results in a slab-out-of-bounds read in io_bundle_nbufs() from the kmalloc-64 slab, as nbufs increments past the allocated iovec entries. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in io_bundle_nbufs+0x128/0x160 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888100ae05c8 by task exp/145 Call Trace: io_bundle_nbufs+0x128/0x160 io_recv_finish+0x117/0xe20 io_recv+0x2db/0x1160 Fix this by rejecting negative sr->len values early in both io_sendmsg_prep() and io_recvmsg_prep(). Since sqe->len is __u32, any value > INT_MAX indicates overflow and is not a valid length. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31742 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vt: discard stale unicode buffer on alt screen exit after resize When enter_alt_screen() saves vc_uni_lines into vc_saved_uni_lines and sets vc_uni_lines to NULL, a subsequent console resize via vc_do_resize() skips reallocating the unicode buffer because vc_uni_lines is NULL. However, vc_saved_uni_lines still points to the old buffer allocated for the original dimensions. When leave_alt_screen() later restores vc_saved_uni_lines, the buffer dimensions no longer match vc_rows/vc_cols. Any operation that iterates over the unicode buffer using the current dimensions (e.g. csi_J clearing the screen) will access memory out of bounds, causing a kernel oops: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0x0000002000000020 RIP: 0010:csi_J+0x133/0x2d0 The faulting address 0x0000002000000020 is two adjacent u32 space characters (0x20) interpreted as a pointer, read from the row data area past the end of the 25-entry pointer array in a buffer allocated for 80x25 but accessed with 240x67 dimensions. Fix this by checking whether the console dimensions changed while in the alternate screen. If they did, free the stale saved buffer instead of restoring it. The unicode screen will be lazily rebuilt via vc_uniscr_check() when next needed. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31675 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.8 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sch_netem: fix out-of-bounds access in packet corruption In netem_enqueue(), the packet corruption logic uses get_random_u32_below(skb_headlen(skb)) to select an index for modifying skb->data. When an AF_PACKET TX_RING sends fully non-linear packets over an IPIP tunnel, skb_headlen(skb) evaluates to 0. Passing 0 to get_random_u32_below() takes the variable-ceil slow path which returns an unconstrained 32-bit random integer. Using this unconstrained value as an offset into skb->data results in an out-of-bounds memory access. Fix this by verifying skb_headlen(skb) is non-zero before attempting to corrupt the linear data area. Fully non-linear packets will silently bypass the corruption logic. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31636 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 9.1 CRITICAL |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: fix RESPONSE authenticator parser OOB read rxgk_verify_authenticator() copies auth_len bytes into a temporary buffer and then passes p + auth_len as the parser limit to rxgk_do_verify_authenticator(). Since p is a __be32 *, that inflates the parser end pointer by a factor of four and lets malformed RESPONSE authenticators read past the kmalloc() buffer. Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rxgk_verify_response() Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl() [lib/dump_stack.c:123] print_report() [mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482] kasan_report() [mm/kasan/report.c:597] rxgk_verify_response() [net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1103 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1167 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1274] rxrpc_process_connection() [net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386] process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281] worker_thread() [kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440] kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436] ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164] Allocated by task 54: rxgk_verify_response() [include/linux/slab.h:954 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1155 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1274] rxrpc_process_connection() [net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386] Convert the byte count to __be32 units before constructing the parser limit. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31614 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 7.1 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas() The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0. The strncmp() later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen. Isn't pointer math fun? The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8 bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past the end of iov. Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds check. An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is interpreted as. | |||||
| CVE-2026-31613 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-17 | N/A | 8.1 HIGH |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix OOB reads parsing symlink error response When a CREATE returns STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK, smb2_check_message() returns success without any length validation, leaving the symlink parsers as the only defense against an untrusted server. symlink_data() walks SMB 3.1.1 error contexts with the loop test "p < end", but reads p->ErrorId at offset 4 and p->ErrorDataLength at offset 0. When the server-controlled ErrorDataLength advances p to within 1-7 bytes of end, the next iteration will read past it. When the matching context is found, sym->SymLinkErrorTag is read at offset 4 from p->ErrorContextData with no check that the symlink header itself fits. smb2_parse_symlink_response() then bounds-checks the substitute name using SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE as the offset of PathBuffer from iov_base. That value is computed as sizeof(smb2_err_rsp) + sizeof(smb2_symlink_err_rsp), which is correct only when ErrorContextCount == 0. With at least one error context the symlink data sits 8 bytes deeper, and each skipped non-matching context shifts it further by 8 + ALIGN(ErrorDataLength, 8). The check is too short, allowing the substitute name read to run past iov_len. The out-of-bound heap bytes are UTF-16-decoded into the symlink target and returned to userspace via readlink(2). Fix this all up by making the loops test require the full context header to fit, rejecting sym if its header runs past end, and bound the substitute name against the actual position of sym->PathBuffer rather than a fixed offset. Because sub_offs and sub_len are 16bits, the pointer math will not overflow here with the new greater-than. | |||||