The Tauri updater plugin verifies update binaries using minisign signatures, but the signature covers only the raw binary bytes. The update manifest -- which contains the version number, download URL, and signature -- is fetched over TLS but is never itself signed or authenticated. Because the only anti-rollback check compares the manifest's version field against the current version, and that field is unsigned, an attacker who can serve a crafted manifest can force installation of any older signed release without possessing the developer's private key.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
23 Sep 2026, 09:17
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-09-23 09:17
Updated : 2026-09-23 19:42
NVD link : CVE-2026-95625
Mitre link : CVE-2026-95625
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-95625
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
CWE-354
Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
