Nodemailer (npm package `nodemailer`) versions 9.1.0 and earlier do not honor the `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` sandbox options when message content is resolved through the public plugin API `MailMessage.resolveContent()` using the documented legacy three-argument signature `resolveContent(data, key, callback)`. Because `shared.resolveContent()` normalizes the missing `options` argument to an empty object, the message-level flags copied into `mail.data` by the MailMessage constructor are discarded, and `resolveContentValue()` skips both access-control checks, reaching `nmfetch(url)` or `fs.createReadStream(path)`. As a result, plugin or application code that resolves untrusted message content (html, text, attachment `path` or `href`) via this API can be induced to read arbitrary local files or issue outbound HTTP(S) requests (server-side request forgery), bypassing the sandbox the application enabled. The internal paths used by `transporter.sendMail()` (`resolveAll()`, `_convertDataImages()`, and the MIME streaming path) are not affected. Fixed in version 9.1.1.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
19 Sep 2026, 03:17
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References | () https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjj - |
16 Sep 2026, 22:18
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-09-16 22:18
Updated : 2026-09-22 20:25
NVD link : CVE-2026-92595
Mitre link : CVE-2026-92595
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-92595
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
CWE-73
External Control of File Name or Path
