CVE-2026-80778

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: futex/pi: Reject cross-mm private futex owners A private futex key borrows the waiter's mm without taking an mm_users reference. Nevertheless, attach_to_pi_owner() currently accepts an owner from a different address space and copies the private key into the owner's PI state. When that owner exits, exit_pi_state_list() uses the saved key to find the hash bucket and acquires a reference to the waiter's private hash. If the last user of the waiter's mm exits concurrently, futex_hash_free() frees the hash while the owner still uses its bucket and reference. Prevent this by validating in attach_to_pi_owner() that, for private futexes, the owner mm and waiter mm are the same. Perform the check with the owner's pi_lock held and after validating owner::futex::state to serialize against a concurrent PI-state exit cleanup. [ tglx: Amended comment ]

CVSS

No CVSS.

References

Link	Resource
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b92e5562653b5293529f63b0300837d9dcedbd7
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43b148d796aa338858792d0167cebdc12b8cb4b9
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59b3732f95dda1fbd2234514d35f4fb6b5bb6d85
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7fb3e07752688842cbe0b85cf0d98c2fbf76b68

Configurations

No configuration.

History

No history.

Information

Published : 2026-09-04 16:18

Updated : 2026-09-04 16:18

NVD link : CVE-2026-80778

Mitre link : CVE-2026-80778

CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-80778

JSON object : View

Products Affected

No product.

CWE

No CWE.

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