AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.
Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool's existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.
The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.
This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3.
CVSS
No CVSS.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
No history.
Information
Published : 2026-09-08 17:18
Updated : 2026-09-08 19:29
NVD link : CVE-2026-78230
Mitre link : CVE-2026-78230
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-78230
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
CWE-1220
Insufficient Granularity of Access Control