is_path_trusted in scripts/iib/api.py compares the requested path against each allowed parent directory with path.startswith(parent_path), without appending a path separator. A directory whose name merely begins with an allowed path therefore satisfies the comparison, so where /data/images is allowed a request for /data/images_private/secret.txt is treated as trusted and served by FileResponse, disclosing files the confinement was meant to exclude. Whether the check applies depends on get_enable_access_control in scripts/iib/tool.py: it returns true when IIB_ACCESS_CONTROL is set to enable, false when set to disable, and otherwise true when the host Stable Diffusion WebUI was started with share, ngrok, listen or server_name, falling back to false. Confinement is therefore active in the network-exposed WebUI deployments that rely on it, while a standalone run with no such option serves every readable file regardless of this flaw. The fix compares against parent_path joined with os.sep.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
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Information
Published : 2026-08-21 15:16
Updated : 2026-08-21 18:16
NVD link : CVE-2026-77814
Mitre link : CVE-2026-77814
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-77814
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
CWE-22
Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')