CVE-2026-72889

{"id": "CVE-2026-72889", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-72889", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "yes"}, {"technicalImpact": "total"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-08-26T18:02:49.745063Z"}}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "cvssData": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 9.8, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}, "impactScore": 5.9, "exploitabilityScore": 3.9}]}, "affected": [{"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e", "affectedData": [{"repo": "https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth", "modules": ["Net::OAuth"], "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "0", "lessThan": "0.33", "versionType": "custom"}], "packageURL": "pkg:cpan/Net-OAuth", "packageName": "Net-OAuth", "programFiles": ["lib/Net/OAuth/Message.pm", "lib/Net/OAuth/Request.pm"], "collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "programRoutines": [{"name": "Net::OAuth::Message::verify"}, {"name": "Net::OAuth::Message::_signature_method_class"}, {"name": "Net::OAuth::Request::signature_key"}]}]}], "published": "2026-08-19T08:17:13.833", "references": [{"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.2", "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"}, {"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.3", "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"}, {"url": "https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/commit/c467adf45c8d77ac4b92ad78b3eebf949252ba7f.patch", "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"}, {"url": "https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/security/advisories/GHSA-c8rm-g5cm-4pf5", "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"}, {"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/RRWO/Net-OAuth-0.33/changes", "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"}, {"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/19/2", "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108"}], "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-347"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-757"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.\n\nverify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.\n\nA provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "Las versiones de Net::OAuth anteriores a la 0.33 para Perl permiten al remitente elegir el algoritmo de firma en verify.\n\nverify resuelve la clase del m\u00e9todo de firma a partir del par\u00e1metro signature_method del mensaje entrante. signature_method es requerido en cada solicitud, por lo que el algoritmo utilizado para verificar una firma es elegido por quien la envi\u00f3, y nada permite a la parte verificadora fijar el m\u00e9todo en su lugar. Cuando un mensaje nombra HMAC-SHA1 o HMAC-SHA256, la clave se deriva de consumer_secret y token_secret en lugar de la clave que el proveedor implement\u00f3.\n\nUn proveedor implementado en RSA-SHA1 solo posee la clave p\u00fablica del consumidor, y RFC 5849 no utiliza consumer_secret para ese m\u00e9todo, por lo que el par\u00e1metro requerido se rellena con un marcador de posici\u00f3n. Un cliente que nombra HMAC-SHA1 en su lugar tiene su firma verificada contra ese marcador de posici\u00f3n, por lo que uno adivinable es suficiente para falsificar solicitudes para cualquier clave de consumidor y token."}], "lastModified": "2026-10-27T12:10:00.343", "sourceIdentifier": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"}