In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check
smb2_ioctl_query_info() validates the PASSTHRU_FSCTL response payload
before copying it to userspace.
The payload offset and length both come from 32-bit fields. The bounds
check currently adds OutputOffset and qi.input_buffer_length directly, so
the addition can wrap in 32-bit arithmetic before the result is compared
against the response buffer length.
A malicious server can use a large OutputOffset and a small OutputCount
to make the wrapped sum pass the bounds check. The later copy_to_user()
then reads from io_rsp + OutputOffset, outside the response buffer.
Use size_add() for the offset plus length check so overflow is treated as
out of bounds.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
No history.
Information
Published : 2026-08-15 06:22
Updated : 2026-08-17 06:18
NVD link : CVE-2026-72310
Mitre link : CVE-2026-72310
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-72310
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
No CWE.