In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing
sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology
private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a
malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the
parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available.
Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete
snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size.
The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int,
but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes
negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check,
as reported in the stable review thread reference below.
Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This
rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser
dispatches to the tuple-specific code.
CVSS
No CVSS.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
No history.
Information
Published : 2026-08-15 06:22
Updated : 2026-08-17 06:18
NVD link : CVE-2026-72300
Mitre link : CVE-2026-72300
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-72300
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
No CWE.