CVE-2026-71272

Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address.

CVSS v3 8.5 HIGH

8.5^/10

CVSS v3 : HIGH

Vector :

Exploitability : 3.1 / Impact : 4.7

Attack Vector NETWORK

Attack Complexity LOW

Privileges Required LOW

User Interaction NONE

Confidentiality Impact HIGH

Integrity Impact LOW

Availability Impact NONE

Scope CHANGED

References

Link	Resource
https://github.com/usememos/memos
https://github.com/usememos/memos/blob/main/internal/webhook/webhook.go

Configurations

No configuration.

History

23 Oct 2026, 21:10

Type	Values Removed	Values Added
Summary		(es) La función de despacho de webhook de Memos safeDialContext() (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resuelve el nombre de host de destino a través de net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost() y valida las direcciones IP resultantes contra rangos reservados, pero luego marca net.JoinHostPort(host, port) usando el nombre de host original en lugar de la dirección IP ya validada. Debido a que net.Dialer.DialContext() realiza su propia resolución DNS independiente, un atacante que controla el DNS para el nombre de host del webhook (por ejemplo, a través de un TTL corto) puede devolver una dirección IP pública y permitida durante la validación y una dirección IP interna diferente en el momento de la marcación - una clásica omisión de la protección SSRF por reencuadernación de DNS de tipo tiempo de verificación/tiempo de uso.

Information

Published : 2026-08-05 13:24

Updated : 2026-10-24 15:10

NVD link : CVE-2026-71272

Mitre link : CVE-2026-71272

CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-71272

JSON object : View

Products Affected

No product.

CWE

CWE-367

Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

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