In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len
handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode
boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the size of the reused
reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received.
A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the
second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier
message, causing an uninitialized memory read.
Use msg->front.iov_len as the receive-side decode boundary, matching
other libceph reply handlers and limiting decoding to the bytes that
were actually read from the wire.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
No history.
Information
Published : 2026-08-12 00:17
Updated : 2026-08-19 17:20
NVD link : CVE-2026-68433
Mitre link : CVE-2026-68433
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-68433
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
No CWE.
