CVE-2026-65198

Huawei's openUBMC ships a default SNMPv3 USM key that uses one value for both authentication and privacy. An attacker who holds the key (recoverable from the open-source build) can authenticate SNMPv3 to, and decrypt SNMPv3 traffic from, any unit that still carries the shipped key. The build customization `manifest/build/customization/default_password.lua` sets `AuthenticationKey == EncryptionKey == 7df2f29369e3ac3245b2c9d46b67a0ecd055197e41808a34ef325db2f6422581` for the iBMC product build, and the community seed `account/manufacture/default_password.lua` sets both to `7a2f5b86f20233ec7b7bef49643fbf34d86d0cbf6f1f8f5c52d4f30d4536938b`. These are shipped constants, not per-unit values, and they are not rotated by the Administrator password reset, so they survive account provisioning. This is especially dangerous considering that SNMP access is mapped to full device administration privileges, including system reset and firmware upgrades.

CVSS v3 8.6 HIGH

8.6^/10

CVSS v3 : HIGH

Vector :

Exploitability : 3.9 / Impact : 4.7

Attack Vector NETWORK

Attack Complexity LOW

Privileges Required NONE

User Interaction NONE

Confidentiality Impact LOW

Integrity Impact HIGH

Availability Impact LOW

Scope UNCHANGED

References

Link	Resource
https://www.runzero.com/advisories/huawei-default-snmpv3-usm-key-cve-2026-65198

Configurations

No configuration.

History

13 Oct 2026, 15:17

Type	Values Removed	Values Added
New CVE

Information

Published : 2026-10-13 15:17

Updated : 2026-10-16 19:56

NVD link : CVE-2026-65198

Mitre link : CVE-2026-65198

CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-65198

JSON object : View

Products Affected

No product.

CWE

CWE-321

Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key

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