CVE-2026-61826

{"id": "CVE-2026-61826", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "cvssData": {"scope": "CHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 10.0, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}, "impactScore": 6.0, "exploitabilityScore": 3.9}]}, "affected": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "morpheus65535", "product": "bazarr", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "< 1.5.7-beta.14"}]}]}], "published": "2026-10-30T17:17:27.497", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/commit/4bd29252feebd0803e84cc3ce1bdd24c3a076ed4", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/commit/f9a8a9514944be0e7b826e67cde042cebfe9c97e", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/security/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-hh55-x3r4", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/tree/v1.5.7-beta.14", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}], "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Primary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-352"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-862"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the `api_ns_plex` namespace in `bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py` omits `@authenticate` on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke `POST /api/plex/oauth/logout` to clear credentials and disable the integration, or `POST /api/plex/apikey` to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. `POST /api/plex/oauth/pin` and `GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pin_id>/check` additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. `PlexPinCheck` skips state validation when `state_param` is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. `POST /api/plex/select-server`, `POST /api/plex/oauth/servers`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/create`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/delete` and `POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey` expose further `write_config()` operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in `X-Plex-Token`, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review."}], "lastModified": "2026-10-30T19:39:14.897", "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"}