CVE-2026-58076

Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.
Configurations

Configuration 1 (hide)

cpe:2.3:a:apache:airflow:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

History

No history.

Information

Published : 2026-08-12 16:17

Updated : 2026-09-16 15:17


NVD link : CVE-2026-58076

Mitre link : CVE-2026-58076

CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-58076


JSON object : View

Products Affected

apache

  • airflow
CWE
CWE-502

Deserialization of Untrusted Data