CVE-2026-57494

{"id": "CVE-2026-57494", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-57494", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "poc"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-07-21T13:13:34.696485Z"}}], "cvssMetricV40": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "cvssData": {"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "version": "4.0", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 7.1, "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED"}}]}, "affected": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "agenticmail", "product": "@agenticmail/api", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "< 0.9.64"}]}]}], "published": "2026-07-20T22:17:16.970", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/agenticmail/agenticmail/security/advisories/GHSA-hjwc-26pj-v3pm", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/agenticmail/agenticmail/security/advisories/GHSA-hjwc-26pj-v3pm", "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"}], "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-639"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-862"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. In @agenticmail/api prior to version 0.9.64, a low-privileged authenticated AgenticMail agent can enumerate another agent's pending/claimed tasks by supplying the target agent name to `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=<name>`. The returned task objects include the task IDs and payloads. The same task IDs can then be used with the capability-style task mutation endpoints (`/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`) to claim, complete, or fail tasks assigned to a different agent. Because ordinary authenticated agents can discover agent names through `GET /api/agenticmail/accounts/directory`, the task ID effectively stops being a secret capability. This turns the intended capability model into a cross-agent authorization bypass. Version 0.9.64 contains a fix."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "AgenticMail proporciona a los agentes de IA direcciones de correo electr\u00f3nico y n\u00fameros de tel\u00e9fono reales. En @agenticmail/api, anterior a la versi\u00f3n 0.9.64, un agente de AgenticMail autenticado con bajos privilegios puede enumerar las tareas pendientes/reclamadas de otro agente al proporcionar el nombre del agente objetivo a GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=[name]. Los objetos de tarea devueltos incluyen los ID de tarea y las cargas \u00fatiles. Los mismos ID de tarea pueden luego ser utilizados con los puntos finales de mutaci\u00f3n de tareas de estilo de capacidad (/tasks/:id/claim, /tasks/:id/result, /tasks/:id/complete, /tasks/:id/fail) para reclamar, completar o fallar tareas asignadas a un agente diferente. Debido a que los agentes autenticados ordinarios pueden descubrir nombres de agentes a trav\u00e9s de GET /api/agenticmail/accounts/directory, el ID de tarea deja de ser efectivamente una capacidad secreta. Esto convierte el modelo de capacidad previsto en una omisi\u00f3n de autorizaci\u00f3n entre agentes. La versi\u00f3n 0.9.64 contiene una correcci\u00f3n."}], "lastModified": "2026-10-24T20:10:00.137", "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"}