PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.87 to before version 4.6.61, PraisonAI recipe execution has a dangerous-tool policy that is supposed to block default-denied tools unless the caller explicitly passes allow_dangerous_tools=True. That policy only checks tools declared in TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools. For steps-based recipes, the actual execution path loads workflow.yaml with YAMLWorkflowParser. That parser resolves agent-level tools: declarations and preserves top-level approve:. Workflow.start() then installs those YAML-approved tools into the approval context. As a result, an untrusted recipe can omit execute_command from TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools, declare it in workflow.yaml agents.*.tools, and add top-level approve: [execute_command]. The caller did not set allow_dangerous_tools=True, but the recipe policy allows the recipe and the workflow approval path self-approves the critical shell tool. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
29 Oct 2026, 14:17
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References | () https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7qw2-w5rc-37x2 - |
23 Oct 2026, 13:17
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-10-23 13:17
Updated : 2026-10-29 14:17
NVD link : CVE-2026-57142
Mitre link : CVE-2026-57142
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-57142
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
