PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.126 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates webhook_url when a job request is parsed and again when the internal Job object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, _send_webhook() passes the original hostname to httpx.AsyncClient.post() with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in current supported releases. This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
29 Oct 2026, 14:17
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References | () https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v - |
23 Oct 2026, 13:17
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-10-23 13:17
Updated : 2026-10-29 14:17
NVD link : CVE-2026-57114
Mitre link : CVE-2026-57114
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-57114
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
