CVE-2026-55524

{"id": "CVE-2026-55524", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-55524", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "poc"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-08-06T14:41:35.294289Z"}}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "cvssData": {"scope": "CHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 7.5, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}, "impactScore": 4.7, "exploitabilityScore": 2.2}]}, "affected": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "MervinPraison", "product": "PraisonAI", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "< 1.6.58"}]}]}], "published": "2026-08-05T20:17:10.847", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj", "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"}], "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-367"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-918"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "PraisonAI es un sistema de equipos multiagente. En versiones anteriores a la 1.6.58, la herramienta web_crawl realiza su verificaci\u00f3n de SSRF solo en la URL suministrada inicialmente, permitiendo que la protecci\u00f3n sea eludida para que la herramienta se conecte a destinos internos elegidos por el atacante. La verificaci\u00f3n resuelve el nombre de host una vez con socket.gethostbyname y rechaza resultados privados/loopback/link-local, pero luego pasa la URL a un \u2019fetcher\u2019 usando httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (o urllib.request.urlopen cuando httpx est\u00e1 ausente, que tambi\u00e9n sigue redirecciones) que vuelve a resolver el nombre de host en el momento de la conexi\u00f3n sin validaci\u00f3n adicional. Esta brecha de validar aqu\u00ed/obtener all\u00e1 es explotable a trav\u00e9s de redirecciones HTTP y DNS rebinding. Si un atacante puede influir en las URL pasadas a web_crawl(), directamente o a trav\u00e9s de un flujo de trabajo de agente/herramienta, pueden hacer que el host de PraisonAI obtenga puntos finales de loopback, de red privada o de metadatos de la nube accesibles desde ese host, con el cuerpo de la respuesta devuelto en el resultado de web_crawl(). Este problema ha sido solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 1.6.58."}], "lastModified": "2026-10-24T16:10:00.153", "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"}