CVE-2026-55176

{"id": "CVE-2026-55176", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-55176", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "poc"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "total"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-10-02T16:22:21.804846Z"}}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "cvssData": {"scope": "CHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 9.0, "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}, "impactScore": 6.0, "exploitabilityScore": 2.3}]}, "affected": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "Soft-Machine-io", "product": "security", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<= 0.2.247"}]}]}], "published": "2026-09-30T17:16:46.630", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/Soft-Machine-io/security/security/advisories/GHSA-63gh-vp9f-vxhj", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/Soft-Machine-io/security/security/advisories/GHSA-63gh-vp9f-vxhj", "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"}], "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-863"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Soft Machine is a Virtual Machine\u2013based agentic development environment / Cloud OS. In versions 0.2.247 and prior, two authentication helpers in /app/server.js \u2014 verifyContainerAuth() and authenticateWorkspaceHttp() \u2014 accept the global CONTAINER_SHARED_SECRET as a bearer token without verifying which workspace the caller belongs to. Because that secret is set identically on every container in the Fly app and is reachable from the user-facing process environment inside each workspace, any tenant can use it to authenticate to any other tenant's workspace API. The result is cross-workspace read, write, and destructive-restore primitives reachable from any paying customer's shell. The existing per-workspace token check (workspaceTokenMatches) protects the user-facing per-workspace token path, but the shared-secret bearer path bypasses it entirely. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches."}], "lastModified": "2026-10-02T17:17:06.177", "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"}