Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
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Information
Published : 2026-09-14 16:17
Updated : 2026-09-14 20:16
NVD link : CVE-2026-54542
Mitre link : CVE-2026-54542
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-54542
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
CWE-125
Out-of-bounds Read
