In wolfSSL, ARIA-GCM cipher suites used in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 reuse an identical 12-byte GCM nonce for every application-data record. Because wc_AriaEncrypt is stateless and passes the caller-supplied IV verbatim to the MagicCrypto SDK with no internal counter, and because the explicit IV is zero-initialized at session setup and never incremented in non-FIPS builds. This vulnerability affects wolfSSL builds configured with --enable-aria and the proprietary MagicCrypto SDK (a non-default, opt-in configuration required for Korean regulatory deployments). AES-GCM is not affected because wc_AesGcmEncrypt_ex maintains an internal invocation counter independently of the call-site guard.
References
| Link | Resource |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/10111 | Issue Tracking Patch |
Configurations
History
No history.
Information
Published : 2026-04-09 21:16
Updated : 2026-06-17 10:59
NVD link : CVE-2026-5446
Mitre link : CVE-2026-5446
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-5446
JSON object : View
Products Affected
wolfssl
- wolfssl
CWE
CWE-323
Reusing a Nonce, Key Pair in Encryption
