CVE-2026-53604

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.
CVSS

No CVSS.

Configurations

No configuration.

History

No history.

Information

Published : 2026-09-04 20:17

Updated : 2026-09-08 21:05


NVD link : CVE-2026-53604

Mitre link : CVE-2026-53604

CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-53604


JSON object : View

Products Affected

No product.

CWE
CWE-212

Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer

CWE-316

Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in Memory