In OpENer 2.3.0 (commit 76b95cf) when parsing incoming CIP (Common Industrial Protocol) network packets, the length parameter is inconsistently typed across the call stack. Specifically, an upstream length calculated as an int is passed to a downstream function that expects an EipInt16 (a 16-bit signed integer). If a maliciously crafted packet with specific length fields is processed, the length parameter can overflow or be truncated into a negative value. This negative length bypasses subsequent bounds checking (due to signed/unsigned comparison issues) and is ultimately used in memory operations, leading to a Stack Buffer Overflow when reading data in DecodePaddedEPath.
References
| Link | Resource |
|---|---|
| https://gist.github.com/MrAlaskan/e160c626a32e03e5d9eddaa732560672 | Third Party Advisory |
| https://github.com/EIPStackGroup/OpENer/issues/563 | Exploit Issue Tracking Vendor Advisory |
| https://github.com/EIPStackGroup/OpENer/issues/563 | Exploit Issue Tracking Vendor Advisory |
Configurations
History
No history.
Information
Published : 2026-07-13 22:16
Updated : 2026-08-11 16:43
NVD link : CVE-2026-51536
Mitre link : CVE-2026-51536
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-51536
JSON object : View
Products Affected
opener_project
- opener
CWE
CWE-190
Integer Overflow or Wraparound
