CVE-2026-47751

{"id": "CVE-2026-47751", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-47751", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "yes"}, {"technicalImpact": "total"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-07-18T02:55:45.984671Z"}}], "cvssMetricV40": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "cvssData": {"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "version": "4.0", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 5.3, "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED"}}]}, "affected": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "anthropics", "product": "claude-code-action", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "< 1.0.74"}]}]}], "published": "2026-07-16T17:16:57.357", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/commit/9ddce40de8c1ab71fb6303a125fdad0968dc1312", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/pull/1066", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/releases/tag/v1.0.74", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/security/advisories/GHSA-8q5r-mmjf-575q", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}], "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-78"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-200"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Claude Code Action is a general-purpose GitHub action that runs Claude Code on GitHub pull requests and issues. Prior to 1.0.74, because the action checked out attacker-controlled pull request head branches, read .mcp.json from the working directory via default setting sources, and unconditionally enabled all project MCP servers via enableAllProjectMcpServers, an attacker who opened a pull request containing a malicious .mcp.json file could achieve arbitrary code execution on the GitHub Actions runner and exfiltrate secrets available to the workflow (such as API keys and tokens) when a privileged user or an automatic trigger invoked the Claude action on the pull request. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.74, which restores .claude/ and .mcp.json from the pull request base branch before the CLI runs."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "Claude Code Action es una acci\u00f3n de GitHub de prop\u00f3sito general que ejecuta Claude Code en solicitudes de extracci\u00f3n y problemas de GitHub. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 1.0.74, debido a que la acci\u00f3n extra\u00eda ramas de cabecera de solicitudes de extracci\u00f3n controladas por el atacante, le\u00eda .mcp.json del directorio de trabajo a trav\u00e9s de fuentes de configuraci\u00f3n predeterminadas y habilitaba incondicionalmente todos los servidores MCP del proyecto a trav\u00e9s de enableAllProjectMcpServers, un atacante que abriera una solicitud de extracci\u00f3n que contuviera un archivo .mcp.json malicioso podr\u00eda lograr la ejecuci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo arbitrario en el ejecutor de GitHub Actions y exfiltrar secretos disponibles para el flujo de trabajo (como claves API y tokens) cuando un usuario privilegiado o un disparador autom\u00e1tico invocaba la acci\u00f3n de Claude en la solicitud de extracci\u00f3n. Este problema se soluciona en la versi\u00f3n 1.0.74, que restaura .claude/ y .mcp.json de la rama base de la solicitud de extracci\u00f3n antes de que se ejecute la CLI."}], "lastModified": "2026-10-24T20:10:00.137", "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"}