CVE-2026-47172

{"id": "CVE-2026-47172", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-47172", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "poc"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "total"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-06-11T19:37:57.133334Z"}}], "cvssMetricV40": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "cvssData": {"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "version": "4.0", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 9.5, "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED"}}]}, "affected": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "duck-organization", "product": "quest-bot", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "< 1.0.3"}]}]}], "published": "2026-06-11T19:16:45.240", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/duck-organization/questbot/releases/tag/questbot-v1.0.3", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/duck-organization/questbot/security/advisories/GHSA-9qf3-c86c-j346", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/duck-organization/questbot/security/advisories/GHSA-9qf3-c86c-j346", "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"}], "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-829"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow\u2019s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "Quest Bot es un bot de Discord moderno de c\u00f3digo abierto dise\u00f1ado para moderaci\u00f3n, utilidades y soporte. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 1.0.3, el repositorio tiene un flujo de trabajo de despliegue privilegiado que se ejecuta despu\u00e9s de que el flujo de trabajo de construcci\u00f3n no privilegiado se completa. El flujo de trabajo de construcci\u00f3n se ejecuta en solicitudes de extracci\u00f3n, y el flujo de trabajo de despliegue extrae el head_sha del flujo de trabajo desencadenante, construye ese c\u00f3digo en una imagen de Docker, lo sube como \u2019latest\u2019 y desencadena el despliegue en producci\u00f3n. Si un atacante puede abrir una solicitud de extracci\u00f3n desde una rama llamada \u2019main\u2019, la condici\u00f3n del flujo de trabajo de despliegue puede tratar la construcci\u00f3n de la PR como desplegable y construir el commit controlado por el atacante en un contexto de despliegue privilegiado. Esto puede resultar en el despliegue de contenedores maliciosos y el compromiso del bot en producci\u00f3n. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versi\u00f3n 1.0.3."}], "lastModified": "2026-10-25T23:10:00.167", "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"}