In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic
The 'dumpability' of a task is fundamentally about the memory image of
the task - the concept comes from whether it can core dump or not - and
makes no sense when you don't have an associated mm.
And almost all users do in fact use it only for the case where the task
has a mm pointer.
But we have one odd special case: ptrace_may_access() uses 'dumpable' to
check various other things entirely independently of the MM (typically
explicitly using flags like PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS). Including for
threads that no longer have a VM (and maybe never did, like most kernel
threads).
It's not what this flag was designed for, but it is what it is.
The ptrace code does check that the uid/gid matches, so you do have to
be uid-0 to see kernel thread details, but this means that the
traditional "drop capabilities" model doesn't make any difference for
this all.
Make it all make a *bit* more sense by saying that if you don't have a
MM pointer, we'll use a cached "last dumpability" flag if the thread
ever had a MM (it will be zero for kernel threads since it is never
set), and require a proper CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to override.
References
Configurations
Configuration 1 (hide)
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Configuration 2 (hide)
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History
No history.
Information
Published : 2026-05-15 14:16
Updated : 2026-08-24 13:18
NVD link : CVE-2026-46333
Mitre link : CVE-2026-46333
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-46333
JSON object : View
Products Affected
debian
- debian_linux
linux
- linux_kernel
CWE
CWE-269
Improper Privilege Management