CVE-2026-42461

Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to version 1.18.0, four GET endpoints under /api/templates* in Arcane's Huma backend are registered without any Security requirement, allowing any unauthenticated network client to list and read the full Compose YAML and .env content of every custom template stored in the instance. Because Arcane's UI exposes a "Save as Template" flow on the project / swarm-stack creation pages that persists the operator's real env content (database passwords, API keys, etc.) verbatim, this missing authorization is an unauthenticated read of operator secrets in practice — not a theoretical info-disclosure. The frontend explicitly treats /customize/templates/* as an authenticated area (PROTECTED_PREFIXES in frontend/src/lib/utils/redirect.util.ts), and every CRUD operation (POST/PUT/DELETE) on the same paths requires a Bearer/API key, so this is a clear backend authorization gap, not intended public access. This issue has been patched in version 1.18.0.

CVSS v3 7.5 HIGH

7.5^/10

CVSS v3 : HIGH

Vector :

Exploitability : 3.9 / Impact : 3.6

Attack Vector NETWORK

Attack Complexity LOW

Privileges Required NONE

User Interaction NONE

Confidentiality Impact HIGH

Integrity Impact NONE

Availability Impact NONE

Scope UNCHANGED

References

Link	Resource
https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/releases/tag/v1.18.0	Product Release Notes
https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/security/advisories/GHSA-cxx3-hr75-4q96	Vendor Advisory

Configurations

Configuration 1 (hide)

cpe:2.3:a:getarcane:arcane:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

History

No history.

Information

Published : 2026-05-09 04:16

Updated : 2026-07-24 21:10

NVD link : CVE-2026-42461

Mitre link : CVE-2026-42461

CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-42461

JSON object : View

Products Affected

getarcane

arcane

CWE

CWE-862

Missing Authorization

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Prior to version 1.18.0, four GET endpoints under /api/templates* in Arcane's Huma backend are registered without any Security requirement, allowing any unauthenticated network client to list and read the full Compose YAML and .env content of every custom template stored in the instance. Because Arcane's UI exposes a \"Save as Template\" flow on the project / swarm-stack creation pages that persists the operator's real env content (database passwords, API keys, etc.) verbatim, this missing authorization is an unauthenticated read of operator secrets in practice \u2014 not a theoretical info-disclosure. The frontend explicitly treats /customize/templates/* as an authenticated area (PROTECTED_PREFIXES in frontend/src/lib/utils/redirect.util.ts), and every CRUD operation (POST/PUT/DELETE) on the same paths requires a Bearer/API key, so this is a clear backend authorization gap, not intended public access. This issue has been patched in version 1.18.0."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "Arcane es una interfaz para gestionar contenedores Docker, im\u00e1genes, redes y vol\u00famenes. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 1.18.0, cuatro endpoints GET bajo /api/templates en el backend Huma de Arcane est\u00e1n registrados sin ning\u00fan requisito de seguridad, permitiendo a cualquier cliente de red no autenticado listar y leer el contenido completo de Compose YAML y .env de cada plantilla personalizada almacenada en la instancia. Debido a que la interfaz de usuario de Arcane expone un flujo de 'Guardar como plantilla' en las p\u00e1ginas de creaci\u00f3n de proyectos / swarm-stack que persiste el contenido real del entorno del operador (contrase\u00f1as de base de datos, claves API, etc.) textualmente, esta falta de autorizaci\u00f3n es una lectura no autenticada de secretos del operador en la pr\u00e1ctica - no una divulgaci\u00f3n de informaci\u00f3n te\u00f3rica. El frontend trata expl\u00edcitamente /customize/templates/* como un \u00e1rea autenticada (PROTECTED_PREFIXES en frontend/src/lib/utils/redirect.util.ts), y cada operaci\u00f3n CRUD (POST/PUT/DELETE) en las mismas rutas requiere una clave Bearer/API, por lo que esta es una clara brecha de autorizaci\u00f3n del backend, no un acceso p\u00fablico intencionado. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versi\u00f3n 1.18.0."}], "lastModified": "2026-07-24T21:10:00.143", "configurations": [{"nodes": [{"negate": false, "cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:getarcane:arcane:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "957330EA-4130-479B-B383-FDAE9231C34C", "versionEndExcluding": "1.18.0"}], "operator": "OR"}]}], "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"}