CVE-2026-42213

{"id": "CVE-2026-42213", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-42213", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "poc"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-05-12T12:58:48.342535Z"}}], "cvssMetricV40": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "cvssData": {"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "version": "4.0", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 5.1, "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "userInteraction": "ACTIVE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED"}}]}, "affected": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "anzory", "product": "SolidCAM-GPPL-IDE", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": ">= 1.0.0, < 1.0.2"}]}]}], "published": "2026-05-08T22:16:32.390", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/anzory/SolidCAM-GPPL-IDE/commit/9d0ba808afd143ede448026a5dc681bfdc5c138d", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/anzory/SolidCAM-GPPL-IDE/releases/tag/v1.0.2", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/anzory/SolidCAM-GPPL-IDE/security/advisories/GHSA-xvpx-9p39-g62m", "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/anzory/SolidCAM-GPPL-IDE/security/advisories/GHSA-xvpx-9p39-g62m", "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"}], "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-22"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-200"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-295"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-918"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "SolidCAM-GPPL-IDE is an unofficial, independently developed extension, Postprocessor IDE for SolidCAM. From version 1.0.0 to before version 1.0.2, the inc \"filename\" directive in GPPL postprocessor files is resolved by GpplDocumentLinkHandler into a clickable link (VS Code textDocument/documentLink). The handler accepted arbitrary paths \u2014 absolute, relative with parent-directory segments (..\\..\\..\\), UNC (\\\\server\\share\\), and arbitrary subfolders \u2014 and called File.Exists on each to decide whether to render the link. Two distinct attack surfaces resulted: information disclosure via File.Exists probing and NTLM hash leak via UNC path probing. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.2."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "SolidCAM-GPPL-IDE es una extensi\u00f3n no oficial, desarrollada independientemente, IDE de postprocesador para SolidCAM. Desde la versi\u00f3n 1.0.0 hasta antes de la versi\u00f3n 1.0.2, la directiva inc \u2019filename\u2019 en los archivos de postprocesador GPPL es resuelta por GpplDocumentLinkHandler en un enlace clicable (VS Code textDocument/documentLink). El gestor aceptaba rutas arbitrarias - absolutas, relativas con segmentos de directorio padre (.. / .. / .. / ), UNC (\\\\server\\share\\) y subcarpetas arbitrarias - y llamaba a File.Exists en cada una para decidir si renderizar el enlace. Resultaron dos superficies de ataque distintas: revelaci\u00f3n de informaci\u00f3n mediante sondeo de File.Exists y fuga de hash NTLM mediante sondeo de ruta UNC. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versi\u00f3n 1.0.2."}], "lastModified": "2026-10-26T18:10:00.173", "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"}