A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils implementation continues to monitor a path after it has been replaced by a symbolic link, subsequently outputting the contents of the link's target. In environments where a privileged user (e.g., root) monitors a log directory, a local attacker with write access to that directory can replace a log file with a symlink to a sensitive system file (such as /etc/shadow), causing tail to disclose the contents of the sensitive file.
References
| Link | Resource |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/uutils/coreutils/issues/10328 | Exploit Issue Tracking |
| https://github.com/uutils/coreutils/issues/10328 | Exploit Issue Tracking |
Configurations
History
No history.
Information
Published : 2026-04-22 17:16
Updated : 2026-06-17 10:40
NVD link : CVE-2026-35345
Mitre link : CVE-2026-35345
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-35345
JSON object : View
Products Affected
uutils
- coreutils
