CVE-2026-32884

Botan is a C++ cryptography library. Prior to version 3.11.0, during processing of an X.509 certificate path using name constraints which restrict the set of allowable DNS names, if no subject alternative name is defined in the end-entity certificate Botan would check that the CN was allowed by the DNS name constraints, even though this check is technically not required by RFC 5280. However this check failed to account for the possibility of a mixed-case CN. Thus a certificate with CN=Sub.EVIL.COM and no subject alternative name would bypasses an excludedSubtrees constraint for evil.com because the comparison is case-sensitive. This issue has been patched in version 3.11.0.

CVSS v3 5.9 MEDIUM

5.9^/10

CVSS v3 : MEDIUM

Vector :

Exploitability : 2.2 / Impact : 3.6

Attack Vector NETWORK

Attack Complexity HIGH

Privileges Required NONE

User Interaction NONE

Confidentiality Impact NONE

Integrity Impact HIGH

Availability Impact NONE

Scope UNCHANGED

References

Link	Resource
https://github.com/randombit/botan/security/advisories/GHSA-7c3g-7763-ggj5	Vendor Advisory

Configurations

Configuration 1 (hide)

cpe:2.3:a:botan_project:botan:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

History

No history.

Information

Published : 2026-03-30 21:17

Updated : 2026-06-17 10:36

NVD link : CVE-2026-32884

Mitre link : CVE-2026-32884

CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-32884

JSON object : View

Products Affected

botan_project

botan

CWE

CWE-295

Improper Certificate Validation

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