In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()
The `check_command_size_in_blocks()` function calculates the data size
in bytes by left shifting `common->data_size_from_cmnd` by the block
size (`common->curlun->blkbits`). However, it does not validate whether
this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.
Initially, the block size is set up in `fsg_lun_open()` , and the
`common->data_size_from_cmnd` is set up in `do_scsi_command()`. During
initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction
between two variables.
So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command
requesting a large amount of data (`common->data_size_from_cmnd`), the
left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data
size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory
corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.
Fix this by using the check_shl_overflow() macro to safely perform the
shift and catch any overflows.
References
Configurations
Configuration 1 (hide)
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History
No history.
Information
Published : 2026-04-10 11:16
Updated : 2026-06-17 10:33
NVD link : CVE-2026-31412
Mitre link : CVE-2026-31412
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-31412
JSON object : View
Products Affected
linux
- linux_kernel
CWE
CWE-190
Integer Overflow or Wraparound
