CVE-2026-19869

@neo4j/graphql from 5.2.0 until the patched versions fails to enforce field-level @authentication rules on root custom-resolver fields when a type-level @authentication rule is also present on the same operation type. When both a type-level @authentication (on Query/Mutation) and a field-level @authentication (on a root custom-resolver field within that type) are declared, only the type-level rule is evaluated and the field-level rule is silently discarded. As a result a stricter per-field requirement — such as an admin-role JWT claim (jwt: { roles_INCLUDES: "admin" }) — is never checked, and any client that satisfies the coarser type-level requirement can invoke the more-restricted field. No token forgery is involved: a legitimately issued, correctly signed non-admin token (e.g. roles: ["user"]) is sufficient.

CVSS

No CVSS.

References

Link	Resource
https://github.com/neo4j/graphql/security/advisories/GHSA-82m8-p9px-c3x5
https://neo4j.com/security/CVE-2026-19869

Configurations

No configuration.

History

22 Oct 2026, 22:10

Type	Values Removed	Values Added
Summary		(es) @neo4j/graphql desde la versión 5.2.0 hasta las versiones parcheadas no aplica las reglas de @autenticación a nivel de campo en los campos de resolvedor personalizado raíz cuando una regla de @autenticación a nivel de tipo también está presente en el mismo tipo de operación. Cuando se declaran tanto una @autenticación a nivel de tipo (en Query/Mutation) como una @autenticación a nivel de campo (en un campo de resolvedor personalizado raíz dentro de ese tipo), solo se evalúa la regla a nivel de tipo y la regla a nivel de campo se descarta silenciosamente. Como resultado, un requisito más estricto por campo - como una declaración JWT de rol de administrador (jwt: { roles_INCLUDES: ’admin’ }) - nunca se verifica, y cualquier cliente que satisfaga el requisito más general a nivel de tipo puede invocar el campo más restringido. No hay falsificación de tokens involucrada: un token no-administrador emitido legítimamente y correctamente firmado (p. ej., roles: [’user’]) es suficiente.

Information

Published : 2026-08-18 17:16

Updated : 2026-10-22 22:10

NVD link : CVE-2026-19869

Mitre link : CVE-2026-19869

CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-19869

JSON object : View

Products Affected

No product.

CWE

CWE-639

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

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When both a type-level\u00a0@authentication\u00a0(on\u00a0Query/Mutation) and a field-level\u00a0@authentication\u00a0(on a root custom-resolver field within that type) are declared, only the type-level rule is evaluated and the field-level rule is silently discarded. As a result a stricter per-field requirement \u2014 such as an admin-role JWT claim (jwt: { roles_INCLUDES: \"admin\" }) \u2014 is never checked, and any client that satisfies the coarser type-level requirement can invoke the more-restricted field. No token forgery is involved: a legitimately issued, correctly signed non-admin token (e.g.\u00a0roles: [\"user\"]) is sufficient."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "@neo4j/graphql desde la versi\u00f3n 5.2.0 hasta las versiones parcheadas no aplica las reglas de @autenticaci\u00f3n a nivel de campo en los campos de resolvedor personalizado ra\u00edz cuando una regla de @autenticaci\u00f3n a nivel de tipo tambi\u00e9n est\u00e1 presente en el mismo tipo de operaci\u00f3n. Cuando se declaran tanto una @autenticaci\u00f3n a nivel de tipo (en Query/Mutation) como una @autenticaci\u00f3n a nivel de campo (en un campo de resolvedor personalizado ra\u00edz dentro de ese tipo), solo se eval\u00faa la regla a nivel de tipo y la regla a nivel de campo se descarta silenciosamente. Como resultado, un requisito m\u00e1s estricto por campo - como una declaraci\u00f3n JWT de rol de administrador (jwt: { roles_INCLUDES: \u2019admin\u2019 }) - nunca se verifica, y cualquier cliente que satisfaga el requisito m\u00e1s general a nivel de tipo puede invocar el campo m\u00e1s restringido. No hay falsificaci\u00f3n de tokens involucrada: un token no-administrador emitido leg\u00edtimamente y correctamente firmado (p. ej., roles: [\u2019user\u2019]) es suficiente."}], "lastModified": "2026-10-22T22:10:00.250", "sourceIdentifier": "3b236295-4ccd-4a1f-a1c1-a72eecc8d7b6"}