Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn't a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
No history.
Information
Published : 2026-08-18 20:17
Updated : 2026-09-08 15:28
NVD link : CVE-2026-19671
Mitre link : CVE-2026-19671
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-19671
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
CWE-409
Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
