CVE-2026-13214

{"id": "CVE-2026-13214", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-13214", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "yes"}, {"technicalImpact": "total"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-08-25T15:15:40.750127Z"}}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org", "cvssData": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 9.8, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}, "impactScore": 5.9, "exploitabilityScore": 3.9}]}, "affected": [{"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "zephyrproject", "product": "zephyr", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "4.3.0", "lessThan": "4.4.2", "versionType": "semver"}], "packageName": "zephyr", "programFiles": ["subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c"], "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr", "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}]}], "published": "2026-08-25T05:17:20.060", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/afbf880b04188ae53451a0ade4ac62b654fdff34", "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"}, {"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-fqhf-6v24-4px2", "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"}], "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-787"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c contains a stack buffer overflow in parse_getconfig_msg(). When handling a GetConfiguration request from the central system, the handler copied the attacker-controlled JSON \"key\" string into the caller's fixed 50-byte stack buffer (skey[CISTR50], declared in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c) using an unbounded strcpy(). The parsed key value points directly into the receive buffer, so its length is bounded only by the message size (CONFIG_OCPP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, default 2048).\n\nThe GetConfiguration message is delivered over the WebSocket connection that the charge point opens to its configured central system. The reader thread ocpp_wsreader() reads the message into ui->recv_buf and dispatches it to parse_getconfig_msg() via the PDU function table. An attacker who controls the central system endpoint, or a man-in-the-middle on an unencrypted connection, can send a GetConfiguration request whose \"key\" field exceeds 50 bytes and overflow the reader thread's stack with attacker-chosen bytes.\n\nThe consequence is a remotely triggerable stack smash on the OCPP reader thread: at minimum a denial of service, and plausibly remote code execution depending on build-time hardening such as stack canaries and MPU configuration. The fix replaces the strcpy() with a bounded strncpy(key, payload.key[0], CISTR50 - 1) followed by explicit NUL termination, matching the bounded copies already used by the sibling handlers."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "El cliente OCPP 1.6 en subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c contiene un desbordamiento de b\u00fafer de pila en parse_getconfig_msg(). Al manejar una solicitud GetConfiguration del sistema central, el gestor copi\u00f3 la cadena JSON 'key' controlada por el atacante en el b\u00fafer de pila fijo de 50 bytes del llamador (skey[CISTR50], declarado en subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c) usando un strcpy() sin l\u00edmites. El valor de clave analizado apunta directamente al b\u00fafer de recepci\u00f3n, por lo que su longitud est\u00e1 limitada solo por el tama\u00f1o del mensaje (CONFIG_OCPP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, predeterminado 2048).\n\nEl mensaje GetConfiguration se entrega a trav\u00e9s de la conexi\u00f3n WebSocket que el punto de carga abre a su sistema central configurado. El hilo lector ocpp_wsreader() lee el mensaje en ui -> recv_buf y lo despacha a parse_getconfig_msg() a trav\u00e9s de la tabla de funciones PDU. Un atacante que controla el punto final del sistema central, o un man-in-the-middle en una conexi\u00f3n no cifrada, puede enviar una solicitud GetConfiguration cuando campo 'key' excede los 50 bytes y desbordar la pila del hilo lector con bytes elegidos por el atacante.\n\nLa consecuencia es un aplastamiento de pila (stack smash) activable remotamente en el hilo lector OCPP: como m\u00ednimo una denegaci\u00f3n de servicio, y plausiblemente ejecuci\u00f3n remota de c\u00f3digo dependiendo del endurecimiento en tiempo de compilaci\u00f3n, como los canarios de pila y la configuraci\u00f3n de MPU. La soluci\u00f3n reemplaza el strcpy() con un strncpy(key, payload.key[0], CISTR50 - 1) con l\u00edmites, seguido de una terminaci\u00f3n NUL expl\u00edcita, coincidiendo con las copias con l\u00edmites ya utilizadas por los gestores hermanos."}], "lastModified": "2026-09-28T23:10:00.143", "sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"}