Workflows triggered by a pull request review were read from the commit named in the review's `commit_id`, while the fork restrictions were decided by the reviewed pull request, and the commit was not checked to belong to that pull request. A user with read access to a repository could place a commit of their own in it, through a fork pull request or an AGit push, and submit a review naming that commit on a pull request whose head branch is in the same repository. On instances with a runner serving the repository, the attacker's workflow then ran without approval, received the Actions secrets of the repository and its owner, and got a `GITEA_TOKEN` with write access to the repository. Review-triggered workflows now run on the pull request head.
CVSS
No CVSS.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
01 Nov 2026, 10:18
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-11-01 10:18
Updated : 2026-11-01 10:18
NVD link : CVE-2026-118386
Mitre link : CVE-2026-118386
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-118386
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
CWE-863
Incorrect Authorization