CVE-2026-10639

{"id": "CVE-2026-10639", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-10639", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-06-16T15:29:17.028934Z"}}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org", "cvssData": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 4.8, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 2.5, "exploitabilityScore": 2.2}, {"type": "Primary", "source": "nvd@nist.gov", "cvssData": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 4.8, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 2.5, "exploitabilityScore": 2.2}]}, "affected": [{"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "zephyrproject", "product": "zephyr", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "4.2.0", "lessThan": "4.3.1", "versionType": "semver"}, {"status": "affected", "version": "4.4.0", "lessThan": "4.4.1", "versionType": "semver"}], "packageName": "zephyr", "programFiles": ["subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c"], "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr", "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}]}], "published": "2026-06-16T15:16:34.207", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/86e21665d4641f304dc3895bfb03b8f89db83291", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"}, {"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-qhrf-w466-qmpw", "tags": ["Exploit", "Patch", "Vendor Advisory"], "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"}], "vulnStatus": "Modified", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-416"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "In Zephyr's native IPv4 stack, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c builds an echo-reply packet (reply), hands it to net_try_send_data(), and then, on success, calls net_stats_update_icmp_sent(net_pkt_iface(reply)). net_try_send_data() transfers ownership of reply to the TX path (net_if_try_queue_tx -> net_if_tx -> L2/driver send, or the asynchronous net_if_tx_thread), which can unref it to refcount 0 and return the struct net_pkt to its slab (net_pkt_unref -> k_mem_slab_free) before the stats line runs. net_core.c documents this exact contract ('the pkt might contain garbage already ... do not use pkt after that call').\n\nThe post-send net_pkt_iface(reply) therefore reads reply->iface out of a freed (and possibly already reallocated) net_pkt, a use-after-free read; with CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE the stats macro additionally increments a counter through that value, i.e. a dereference/write through a stale or recycled-slot pointer.\n\nThe path is reached unauthenticated by any remote host that pings the device (net_icmpv4_input -> net_icmp_call_ipv4_handlers -> icmpv4_handle_echo_request) and is gated on CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ICMP. Impact is a probabilistic read of recycled packet memory plus a possible wild-pointer write under a timing race, leading most likely to corrupted interface statistics or a remotely triggerable crash (DoS).\n\nThe defect was introduced in 2019 (v1.14) and is present through v4.4.0. The companion change in net_icmpv4_send_error() is not a use-after-free because it reads net_pkt_iface(orig), the caller-owned received packet, which stays alive across the send. The fix caches the interface pointer from the live received packet before sending and uses it for the post-send stats updates."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "En la pila IPv4 nativa de Zephyr, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() en subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c construye un paquete de respuesta de eco (reply), lo entrega a net_try_send_data(), y luego, si tiene \u00e9xito, llama a net_stats_update_icmp_sent(net_pkt_iface(reply)). net_try_send_data() transfiere la propiedad de reply a la ruta TX (net_if_try_queue_tx - net_if_tx - env\u00edo L2/controlador, o el hilo as\u00edncrono net_if_tx_thread), que puede desreferenciarlo a refcount 0 y devolver la estructura net_pkt a su slab (net_pkt_unref - k_mem_slab_free) antes de que se ejecute la l\u00ednea de estad\u00edsticas. net_core.c documenta este contrato exacto (\u2019el pkt podr\u00eda contener basura ya ... no usar pkt despu\u00e9s de esa llamada\u2019).\n\nEl net_pkt_iface(reply) posterior al env\u00edo, por lo tanto, lee reply-iface de un net_pkt liberado (y posiblemente ya reasignado), una lectura de uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n; con CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE la macro de estad\u00edsticas incrementa adicionalmente un contador a trav\u00e9s de ese valor, es decir, una desreferencia/escritura a trav\u00e9s de un puntero obsoleto o de ranura reciclada.\n\nLa ruta es alcanzada sin autenticaci\u00f3n por cualquier host remoto que haga ping al dispositivo (net_icmpv4_input - net_icmp_call_ipv4_handlers - icmpv4_handle_echo_request) y est\u00e1 condicionada a CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ICMP. El impacto es una lectura probabil\u00edstica de memoria de paquete reciclada m\u00e1s una posible escritura de puntero salvaje bajo una condici\u00f3n de carrera de tiempo, lo que lleva muy probablemente a estad\u00edsticas de interfaz corruptas o a un fallo (DoS) que puede ser activado remotamente.\n\nEl defecto fue introducido en 2019 (v1.14) y est\u00e1 presente hasta la v4.4.0. El cambio complementario en net_icmpv4_send_error() no es un uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n porque lee net_pkt_iface(orig), el paquete recibido propiedad del llamador, que permanece activo durante el env\u00edo. La soluci\u00f3n almacena en cach\u00e9 el puntero de interfaz del paquete recibido activo antes de enviar y lo utiliza para las actualizaciones de estad\u00edsticas posteriores al env\u00edo."}], "lastModified": "2026-10-25T23:10:00.167", "configurations": [{"nodes": [{"negate": false, "cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "724B210A-D0E2-4BDF-8986-A1C4691CE210", "versionEndExcluding": "4.5.0", "versionStartIncluding": "1.14.0"}], "operator": "OR"}]}], "sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"}