Two issues in the ThreadX loadable-module loader, reached when a device loads an attacker-controlled module object via `_txm_module_manager_memory_load` / `_txm_module_manager_in_place_load` — APIs that take ONLY a base pointer, no image length, so every size/offset field in `TXM_MODULE_PREAMBLE` is fully attacker-trusted: (1) a heap OOB **read** (`code_size` trusted as the source-image length in the code-copy loop), and (2) a control-flow-integrity / defense-in-depth gap (module entry/start/callback/stop pointers computed as `code_start + preamble_offset` with only a `!= 0` check, and the preamble `checksum` never verified). No controlled OOB write was found (honest — the copy destination is overflow-guarded).
CVSS
No CVSS.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
29 Sep 2026, 18:17
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-09-29 18:17
Updated : 2026-09-29 22:17
NVD link : CVE-2026-102711
Mitre link : CVE-2026-102711
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-102711
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
